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1 
FOR LACK OF A BETTER RULE: USING THE CONCEPT OF 
TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY TO SOLVE THE ERIE PROBLEM IN 
SHADY GROVE 
Stephen R. Brown* 
In the 2010 case, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., the Supreme Court had to decide whether to apply Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to allow the plaintiff to certify its claim as a 
class action or to apply a conflicting state law that precluded class 
treatment of the claim.  In an opinion that implicated issues related to 
class actions, the Erie doctrine, federalism, and the allocation of power 
between Congress and the Supreme Court, five Justices held that Federal 
Rule 23 should apply.  Dissenting with three other Justices, Justice 
Ginsburg argued that the Court had sanctioned the plaintiff’s attempt to 
“transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award.” 
 
Even the five Justices who agreed that Federal Rule 23 should apply, 
however, disagreed about the reasoning.  The disagreement primarily 
was driven by the relative weight that each Justice assigned to the 
competing policy interests at stake—the need for an easily administrable 
rule, the need for fidelity to statutory text, and the need for deference to 
state legislatures.  Shady Grove so fractured the Court that one 
commentator has suggested that there is a “need to reconsider the 
problem from the ground up.” 
 
In this Article, I argue that the competing policy interests that drove the 
disagreement do not actually have to be competing.  Here, I propose a 
novel solution for deciding whether to apply a Federal Rule or a 
conflicting state law.  Under this approach, a Federal Rule should trump 
a state law only when the conflicting state law is transsubstantive.  This 
approach resolves the disagreement in Shady Grove because it is easily 
administrable, is faithful to the statutory text, and is sufficiently 
deferential to state legislatures. 
 
I. Introduction .......................................................................................... 2 
II. The Conflict Between State and Non-Statutory Federal Law ............. 7 
 
 * Stephen R. Brown is an associate at the Chicago office of Jenner & Block LLP.  He received 
his J.D. from the University of Cincinnati College of Law.  This article reflects his personal views, and 
not those of Jenner & Block LLP or of its clients.  The author would like to thank Adam Steinman for 
his helpful comments and suggestions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Rules Enabling Act, enacted in 1934, vests the Supreme Court 
with the authority to promulgate rules of procedure for federal courts, 
subject to the limitation that ―[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or 
2
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modify any substantive right.‖1  The meaning of this Enabling Act 
limitation was the crux of the Supreme Court‘s 2010 case Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.2  There, Shady Grove 
sued Allstate and sought class treatment of a claim under New York law 
for statutory damages.  New York law, however, precluded class 
treatment of a claim for statutory damages.  The Court, therefore, had to 
decide whether allowing Shady Grove‘s claim to proceed as a class 
action under Federal Rule 23 in federal court—despite New York‘s 
prohibition on class treatment of the claim—would ―abridge, enlarge or 
modify‖ a substantive right under New York law.3 
This question produced a divided result: five Justices agreed on an 
answer—that Federal Rule 23 could apply—but the Court was divided 
four to one to four on what test to apply to reach an answer.  So, in 
2010, over seventy years after Congress first enacted the Enabling Act, 
when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must yield to a conflicting state 
law is still unsettled.4 
The Justices‘ disagreement in Shady Grove is not particularly 
surprising.  The ―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ limitation is one part of 
the notoriously difficult5 Erie doctrine—the set of principles governing 
the conflict between state law and non-statutory law from federal 
sources6 in a federal diversity case.7  But the Justices‘ disagreement has 
 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 2. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b); Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436–37. 
 4. See Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie 
Doctrine from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 947 (2011) (―[E]ven after 
seventy-plus years, the Court has been unable to come up with definitions of ‗procedural‘ and 
‗substantive‘ which predictably resolve that distinction.‖).  The Erie decision itself was based, in part, 
on ―the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general 
law and that of local law.‖  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938). 
 5. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 744 (1980) (―The question whether state or 
federal law should apply on various issues arising in an action based on state law which has been 
brought in federal court under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction has troubled this Court for many 
years.‖); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities 
of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 18 (2010) (―Few subjects in the field of Procedure are 
characterized by greater legal abstraction than the collection of doctrines that govern the relationship 
between the federal and state courts.‖).  Professors Burbank and Wolff have persuasively argued that the 
―animating concern‖ for the Enabling Act was ―separation of powers.‖  Id. at 27. 
 6. I use this somewhat clumsy phrase here to avoid characterizing common law announced by 
federal judges as federal common law.  See Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: 
3
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exacerbated the already confused state of the law.8  To borrow an often 
used phrase from Erie‘s progeny, the Supreme Court‘s failure to reach a 
majority resolution will likely cause ―confusion worse confounded.‖9 
There is more at stake in Shady Grove, however, than an academic 
debate about Erie.  The Court‘s failure to agree on an approach for 
resolving the problem in Shady Grove will have important, concrete 
effects on the day-to-day practice in federal courts.10  A lack of guidance 
on the choice between a state law and a conflicting Federal Rule can 
cause a case to turn on what can be fairly characterized as a 
technicality.11  For example,12 a litigant may have his otherwise 
meritorious claim dismissed as untimely commenced because he 
 
From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove 5–6 (Univ. of Pa. Pub. Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-28 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665092 (noting 
the distinction between federal law and ―general law,‖ which ―included most of the classic common law 
subjects of tort and contract [and] was not created by any government, but rather deduced by judges‖). 
 7. Erie, 304 U.S. at 64; 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4501 (2d. ed. 1996) [hereinafter 19 WRIGHT & 
MILLER] (―Stated in general terms, the core of the Erie doctrine is that the substantive law to be applied 
by the federal courts in any case is state law, except when the matter before the court is governed by the 
United States Constitution, an Act of Congress, a treaty, international law, the domestic law of another 
country, or, in special circumstances, by federal common law.‖). 
 8. Professor Jay Tidmarsh has stated that ―Shady Grove‘s fractured opinions suggest the need to 
reconsider the [Enabling Act] problem from the ground up.‖  Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and 
Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 880 (2011). 
 9. Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). 
 10. Cf. Bauer, supra note 4, at 22 (―[U]niformity helps the parties, attorneys and judges know 
what the rules are.  Uniformity in turn also leads to greater ease of administration of the judicial process; 
federal courts will have to look to fewer sources for resolving controversial issues, and they will be 
sources with which the courts are more familiar.‖). 
 11. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 711 (1974) (―[W]e 
can all agree that a situation where a person cannot predict or control where he will be sued, and will 
lose in one court if he does X and lose in the other if he doesn‘t, is one we should certainly try to 
avoid.‖). 
 12. Cf. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 742–44 (1980).  In Walker, less than two 
years after an injury allegedly caused by the defendant‘s negligent manufacture of a nail, the plaintiff 
filed a suit in federal district court in Oklahoma.  Id.  The summons, however, was not served on the 
defendant until about two years and three months after the injury.  Id.  Oklahoma‘s statute of limitations 
required a plaintiff to ―commence[]‖ an action within two years of the injury.  Under Federal Rule 3, an 
action was ―commenced by filing a complaint with the court.‖  FED. R. CIV. P. 3.  Under Oklahoma law, 
however, an action is not ―commenced‖ until ―service of the summons on the defendant.‖  Walker, 446 
U.S. at 742.  The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff‘s suit must be dismissed because of his failure to 
serve the summons on the defendant within the time required by Oklahoma law, despite his 
―commenc[ing]‖ under Federal Rule 3 within two years of the injury.  Id. at 751–53. 
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followed the Federal Rule (defining commencement as when a 
complaint is filed) instead of a state law (defining commencement as 
when a defendant is served).13 
This Article will argue that the fractured result in Shady Grove was 
primarily driven by the relative weight that the Justices assigned to the 
competing policy interests underlying the choice between state law and 
non-statutory law from federal sources.  Justice Scalia (writing for a 
plurality of four justices) stated that a Federal Rule must govern—
regardless of the nature of the conflicting state law—when the Federal 
Rule ―really regulates procedure.‖14  This approach, according to Justice 
Scalia, was easy to apply and avoided the complicated issue of assessing 
the purpose of a conflicting state law.15  Justice Stevens (writing for 
himself and concurring in the judgment) argued that the Federal Rule 
should usually govern unless the state rule is ―so intertwined with a state 
right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created 
right.‖16  Justice Stevens preferred this approach for its fidelity to the 
language of the Enabling Act.17  Finally, Justice Ginsburg (dissenting 
with the support of three other Justices) argued that a court should, 
whenever possible, interpret the Federal Rule to avoid a conflict with an 
―important‖ state law.18  This approach deferred to the judgments made 
by state legislatures consistent with the principles of federalism.19 
 
 13. The obvious response to this objection is that a litigant can simply comply with the more 
demanding rule.  Cf. Ely, supra note 11, at 711.  One point made in support of the Erie doctrine 
generally is that it avoids ―a situation where a person cannot predict or control where he will be sued, 
and will lose in one court if he does X and lose in the other if he doesn‘t.‖  Id.  Professor Ely undercuts 
this justification—with a point that is equally applicable to uncertainty about whether a state law or a 
Federal Rule will govern in federal court—by claiming that ―in every case compliance with the other 
rule would have constituted compliance with both.‖  Id. 
 14. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1445 (2010) (quoting 
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14). 
 15. Id. at 1447 n.15 (arguing that an ―inquiry into the ‗nature and functions‘ of a state law will 
tend to increase, rather than decrease, the difficulty of classifying Federal Rules as substantive or 
procedural‖). 
 16. Id. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 17. Id. at 1454 (criticizing the plurality for ―adopt[ing] a second-best interpretation of the Rules 
Enabling Act . . . in the service of simplicity‖). 
 18. Id. at 1449 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 
U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)) (―[F]ederal rules must be interpreted with some degree of ‗sensitivity to 
important state interests and regulatory policies‘ . . . .‖). 
 19. Id. at 1473 (criticizing the Court for its ―erosion of Erie‘s federalism grounding‖). 
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This was not an intractable20 disagreement about the meaning of 
precedent.21  Rather, the disagreement—along with the resulting 
difficulties it will cause for lower courts and litigants—exists only for 
lack of a better rule. 
This Article proposes a new approach that, by accommodating the 
competing policy interests at stake, can potentially serve as that better 
rule and provide much-needed clarity.  Briefly, when faced with a 
choice between a Federal Rule and a conflicting22 state law, a federal 
court sitting in diversity should apply the Federal Rule when the state 
rule is transsubstantive.23  Conversely, when the state law is not 
 
 20. Others have pointed out that the disagreement between the Justices may not have been as 
severe as it appeared.  See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules 
Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1173 (2011) (arguing that ―some areas 
of the purported disagreement between Scalia an Stevens may be more semantic than substantive‖). 
 21. It must be noted that Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens engage in a debate over the meaning 
of the Sibbach case, a 1941 Supreme Court precedent on the meaning of Enabling Act.  See Shady 
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444–47 (Justice Scalia arguing that the Enabling Act only requires a court to 
determine whether the Federal Rule at issue is procedural); id. at 1454–55 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the Enabling Act requires a court to also examine whether the state law to be trumped by 
the Federal Rule is substantive).  Justice Scalia, however, acknowledges that his approach ―is hard to 
square with [the Enabling Act]‘s terms‖ and to an extent concedes that ―[t]here is something to [Justice 
Stevens‘s approach].‖  Id. at 1445–46 (plurality opinion).  So, although this disagreement exists, the 
disagreement appears to be driven by policy concerns.  For an excellent discussion of the debate over 
Sibbach, see Allen Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: 
The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens (Loyola–LA Legal Studies Paper No. 
2010-36).  As this debate has been substantially covered elsewhere, this Article is written under the 
assumption that Justice Scalia‘s really regulates procedure approach was not compelled or mandated by 
Sibbach. 
 22. Justice Ginsburg, writing in a dissent joined by three others, argued that there was, in fact, no 
conflict between the state rule and the Federal Rule.  This Article will generally assume that a majority 
of the court was correct in holding that there was in fact a conflict between New York‘s Rule 23 and 
Federal Rule 23.  Justice Ginsburg correctly points out that her approach to the Shady Grove case would 
give greater respect to principles of federalism, but her approach also causes uncertainly for litigants—
courts have applied the accommodation approach that she suggests with inconsistency.  See Richard D. 
Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, The Irrepressible Influence of Byrd, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 61, 70 (2010) 
(―Through the years, the court has been anything but consistent in its approach to the important 
funneling function of assessing the breadth of a Federal Rule.‖).  This Article will show, however, that 
the state-law transsubstantivity approach proffered here will adequately respect principles of federalism 
without sacrificing certainty.  See infra Part III.C.  This new approach is directed at solving the specific 
problem at issue in Shady Grove—when the Enabling Act‘s abridge, enlarge or modify limitation 
requires a Federal Rule to yield to a conflicting state law.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).   
 23. For an interesting discussion on the history and development of transsubstantive procedure, 
see David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 
6
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transsubstantive, the federal court should apply the state law.  As will be 
explained further below, this transsubstantivity-based approach (1) will 
not be materially more difficult to apply that Justice Scalia‘s really 
regulates procedure test, (2) is faithful to the text of the Enabling Act, 
and (3) is respectful of the judgments of state legislatures. 
In Part II, this Article will begin by describing how the Supreme 
Court, prior to Shady Grove, approached conflicts between non-statutory 
federal law and state law.  Part II will also describe the important cases 
on the specific conflict between a Federal Rule and a state law.  In Part 
III, this Article will discuss the Shady Grove opinion in detail, 
highlighting how policy preferences had an effect on the three separate 
opinions.  Part IV will describe the state-law transsubstantivity approach 
and discuss how it will better accommodate the various policy issues 
that produced the Court‘s fractured result in Shady Grove.  Throughout 
Part IV, this Article will attempt to confront arguments that can be made 
against the state-law transsubstantivity approach.  In Part V, this Article 
will use two examples to describe how the state-law transsubstantivity 
approach would apply in practice.  Part VI briefly concludes. 
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATUTORY FEDERAL LAW 
For any diversity-of-citizenship case in federal court, when there is a 
conflict between state law and non-statutory law from federal sources, 
the general rule is that ―federal courts are to apply state substantive law 
and federal procedural law.‖24  Although this broad principle applies to 
all conflicts between state law and non-statutory law from federal 
sources, the precise analytical framework under which the conflict is 
resolved depends on the type of non-statutory law.25 
A conflict between state law and non-statutory federal law as 
expounded by federal judges must be resolved under the framework 
 
DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010). 
 24. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). 
 25. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466–69; see also Ely, supra note 11, at 699 (―For whatever Hanna‘s 
other merits or demerits, the major point of the Court‘s opinion was its separation for purposes of 
analysis the Rules of Decision Act, the Enabling Act, and the constitutional demands to which the Erie 
opinion had alluded.‖). 
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announced in the Erie case.26  A conflict between a state law and a 
Federal Rule, on the other hand, must be resolved under the Enabling 
Act.27  The Erie framework is more flexible and allows a court to focus 
on the fairness of applying one of the two conflicting laws.28  
Conversely, the Enabling Act analysis more rigidly depends on the 
categorization of conflicting laws as substantive or procedural.29  To 
avoid this rigidity, courts have sometimes interpreted the scope of a 
Federal Rule to avoid a conflict with state law.30  With the scope of the 
Federal Rule thus limited, the extant conflict is then between state law 
and non-statutory federal law as expounded by federal judges and, 
therefore, is governed by the more flexible Erie analysis.31 
 
 26. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938).  Tompkins sued in federal court and 
claimed that the Erie Railroad Company‘s negligence caused his injuries.  Relevant to Tompkins claim, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that (1) an individual walking along railroad tracks was a 
trespasser and (2) that a railroad ―[wa]s not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from 
its negligence, unless it be wanton or willful.‖  Id. at 70.  The federal trial court adjudicating Tompkins 
claim, however, declined to apply the rule announced by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and did not 
require wanton or willful negligence. 
 27. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466–69. 
 28. See id. at 467 (―The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the 
character or result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in federal 
court.‖); see also Ely, supra note 11, at 712 (―The Court was referring to the unfairness of affording a 
nonresident plaintiff suing a resident defendant a unilateral choice of the rules by which the lawsuit was 
to be determined.‖); id. (noting ―[T]he unfairness of subjecting a person involved in litigation with a 
citizen of a different state to a body of law different from that which applies when his next door 
neighbor is involved in similar litigation with a cocitizen.‖). 
 29. If one accepts Justice Scalia‘s reading of the Sibbach case in Shady Grove, one can also say 
that the Enabling Act analysis is more rigid because it does not allow for the consideration of state law 
that is to be displaced—i.e., once a court determines that a Federal Rule is procedural, the Federal Rule 
automatically trumps the conflicting state law.  See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) (―In sum, it is not the substantive or procedural nature or purpose of 
the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule.‖). 
 30. See Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001) (reasoning that its 
adopted interpretation of Federal Rule 41(b) was supported by the fact that a contrary interpretation 
―would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rule Enabling Act‖); Shady Grove, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1462 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―[W]e have avoided immoderate interpretations of the Federal 
Rules that would trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest.‖); see 
also Freer & Arthur, supra note 22, at 112 (discussing Walker and noting that ―[T]he Court pretty 
clearly applied a substantive canon of construction: if possible, read Federal Rules narrowly to avoid 
trenching on state substantive interests and thus avoid raising serious issues under § 2072(b).‖). 
 31. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring) (―And absent a governing 
federal rule, a federal court must engage in the traditional Rules of Decision Act inquiry, under the Erie 
line of cases.‖); see id. at 1460–65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (summarizing Supreme Court jurisprudence 
8
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Thus, understanding Shady Grove, which involved a potential conflict 
between a state law and Federal Rule 23, requires an understanding of 
three lines of cases: (1) Erie and its progeny, (2) cases construing the 
Enabling Act, and (3) cases where a Federal Rule was interpreted to 
avoid a conflict with state law. 
A. The Rules of Decision Act and Erie 
A conflict between state law and non-statutory federal law as 
expounded by federal judges must be resolved under the framework 
announced in Erie.32  Erie centered around the Rules of Decision Act, 
first enacted in 1789,33 which directs that federal courts must apply state 
―law‖ unless a federal law ―shall otherwise require or provide.‖34  Prior 
to Erie, it had been held that a common law rule announced by a state‘s 
supreme court was not a ―law‖ within the meaning of the Rules of 
Decision Act35; therefore, ―federal courts [we]re free, in the absence of a 
 
on ―avoid[ing] immoderate interpretation of the Federal Rules‖ so that Erie will control‖); see also 19 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4508 (―If the federal rule does not control the point in dispute, and 
thus there is no conflict between state law and the federal rule, the court must apply the federal rule 
within its sphere of coverage, and determine whether to apply the state law to the point in dispute in 
light of the twin aims of Erie.‖). 
 32. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938).  In Erie, the plaintiff Tompkins had been 
walking at night on a ―much used‖ path that ran parallel to railroad tracks in Pennsylvania.  As he was 
walking, a freight train owned by the Erie Railroad Company came toward him.  The train used its 
whistle and headlight to alert Tompkins of its approach but Tompkins did not move off of the path.  
When the train passed, Tompkins was struck and injured by an ―open door swinging from the side of a 
car.‖  Id. at 80–81.  Tompkins sued in federal court and claimed that the Erie Railroad Company‘s 
negligence caused his injuries.   
 33. See 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4502 (noting that the Rules of Decision Act was 
―amended slightly in 1948‖ but ―has remained substantially unchanged‖ from its initial 1789 form). 
 34. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842).  The Rules of Decision Act states that ―the laws of the 
several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise 
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the Courts of the 
United States, in cases where they apply.‖  28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
 35. In interpreting the Rules of Decision Act, the Supreme Court in Swift, 41 U.S. at 18, held that 
―the decisions of the local tribunals‖ were not ―law‖ ―[i]n the ordinary use of language.‖  Wright & 
Miller notes that the ―unarticulated assumption of Swift [is that] the federal judiciary has the power, 
indeed perhaps the duty, to reach the result that appears to it as just, regardless of what the states may 
regard as the proper outcome.‖  19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4502.  For a thorough and 
informative discussion of the Swift case and how the holding in Swift expanded until Erie, see Bradford 
R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1289 (2007). 
9
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local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law 
[wa]s.‖36 
In Erie, the Supreme Court overruled this earlier precedent and held 
that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply a common law rule 
announced by a state‘s supreme court.37  The Erie Court supported its 
holding by identifying two problematic results that flowed from a failure 
to apply a state common law rule.  First, the Court noted that the failure 
to apply state common law had encouraged forum shopping.38  Because 
the outcome of a case could differ in federal court and state court, a 
party could select the most favorable forum.  The Court cited one 
particularly egregious example, where, in anticipation of lawsuit, a 
corporation had re-incorporated under the law of another state to 
manufacture diversity jurisdiction to take advantage of the more 
favorable law applied in federal court.39 
Second, the Court concluded, albeit somewhat cryptically, that the 
failure to apply state common law had ―rendered impossible equal 
protection of the law‖ and had ―prevented uniformity in the 
administration of the law of the State.‖40  Essentially, because the 
―privilege of selecting the court in which the right should be determined 
was conferred upon the non-citizen,‖ the non-citizen in litigation had an 
advantage over a citizen.41  Congress intended diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction to ―prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts 
against those not citizens of the State.‖42  So while diversity jurisdiction 
 
 36. Erie, 304 U.S. at 70 (quoting 90 F.2d 603, 604).  Prior to Erie, Justice Field criticized this 
approach, suggesting that ―what has been termed the general law of the country [] is often little less than 
what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should be the general law on a particular 
subject.‖  Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 37. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80.  The Erie case focused on the language of the Rules of Decision 
Act.  But the Court also held—in a passage about which commentators still debate today—that the 
Constitution compelled the interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act expounded in Erie.  According to 
the Court, when a federal court sitting in diversity failed to apply a rule announced by a state‘s supreme 
court, the federal court ―invaded rights which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to the several States.‖  
Id. at 80–81. 
 38. Id. at 73–74. 
 39. Id. (citing Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 
(1928)). 
 40. Id. at 75. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 74. 
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was meant to level the playing field for non-citizens, before Erie, 
diversity jurisdiction had tipped the scales in favor of non-citizens.43  
These two problematic results were later characterized by the Supreme 
Court as ―the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.‖44 
Separate from these ―twin aims,‖ the Court also reasoned that the 
practice of allowing federal courts to announce and apply general 
common law had ―invaded rights which . . . are reserved by the 
Constitution to the several states.‖45  This constitutional aspect of the 
Erie decision ―rests on the principle that the federal government as a 
whole, including Congress and the federal courts, has no more authority 
than that given it by the Constitution.‖46 
A later case sharpened the focus on the twin aims and suggested the 
rule that, in a diversity case, if application of federal common law over a 
conflicting state law will implicate these twin aims, Erie and its progeny 
require a court to apply the state law.47  At bottom, Erie and its twin 
aims require application of state law when application of the conflicting 
federal law would be ―unfair[].‖48 
B. The Rules Enabling Act 
The framework announced in Erie was intended to resolve a conflict 
 
 43. See id. (―Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens.‖). 
 44. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 
518 U.S. 415, 426–28 (1996) (describing the Erie rule). 
 45. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80; see also 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4505 (―Perhaps no 
aspect of the Erie decision has perplexed the commentators as much as this statement.‖); Clark, supra 
note 35 (exploring the constitutional underpinnings of the Erie case). 
 46. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4505. 
 47. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9 (noting that a court should apply a conflicting state law when 
―application of the [state] rule would make so important a difference to the character or result of the 
litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or 
whether application of the rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the 
litigants that failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court‖). 
 48. Ely, supra note 11, at 712 (―The Court was referring to the unfairness of affording a 
nonresident plaintiff suing a resident defendant a unilateral choice of the rules by which the lawsuit was 
to be determined.‖); id. (noting ―[T]he unfairness of subjecting a person involved in litigation with a 
citizen of a different state to a body of law different from that which applies when his next door 
neighbor is involved in similar litigation with a cocitizen.‖). 
11
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between a state law and non-statutory common law announced by 
federal judges.  The Federal Rules are similarly non-statutory law from a 
federal source.  In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress vested in the 
Supreme Court the authority to promulgate ―general rules of practice 
and procedure‖ to govern in federal courts.49  After the Supreme Court 
has proposed a Rule, the Rule is submitted to Congress for approval.50  
Because of this process, the Supreme Court has treated the Federal 
Rules differently than the law at issue in Erie.51 
1. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 
The earliest relevant Supreme Court decision on the meaning of the 
Enabling Act is Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.52  There, Sibbach was injured 
in a car accident in Indiana.53  She sued in the Northern District of 
Illinois to recover for injuries.54  Wilson & Co. sought to require 
Sibbach to undergo a physical examination under the then newly 
promulgated Federal Rule 35,55 which first came into effect after 
Sibbach filed her suit.56 
To avoid undergoing the physical examination, Sibbach argued that 
Federal Rule 35 violated the Enabling Act‘s ―abridge, enlarge or 
 
 49. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
 50. For a complete (and interesting) discussion of the rulemaking process, see Catherine T. 
Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1099, 1103–19 (2002). 
 51. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1964) (―[T]he court has been instructed to apply 
the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress 
erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the 
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.‖). 
 52. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 53. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 108 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1939); Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6. 
 54. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6. 
 55. Id.  At the time, Federal Rule 35 allowed a district court to order a physical examination in 
an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy, but Federal Rule 
37(b)(2)(iv) ―exempt[ed] from punishment as for contempt the refusal to obey an order that a party 
submit to a physical or mental examination.‖  Id. at 16.  Despite this explicit exception, the district court 
had held Sibbach in contempt for refusing to submit to the ordered physical examination.  Id.  Although 
the Court rejected Sibbach‘s central argument that Rules 35 and 37 violated the Enabling Act, the Court 
reversed the contempt sanction.  Id. 
 56. Ides, supra note 21, at 8 (―When Sibbach filed her suit, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
had yet to go into effect.‖). 
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modify‖ limitation.57  Importantly, under the most plausible reading,58 
Sibbach did not argue that a court order compelling a physical 
examination affected her substantive59 rights (e.g., the right to be free 
from personal ―invasion‖60).  Instead she argued that the Enabling Act‘s 
―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ limitation was meant to prevent the Rules 
from affecting ―important‖ or ―substantial‖ rights.61  This convoluted 
argument—essentially that substantive meant something other than 
substantive—reflected the thorny procedural posture of the case.62 
 The Supreme Court rejected Sibbach‘s interpretation of 
―substantive.‖  According to the Court, ―substantial‖ and ―important‖ 
were too difficult to define: ―If we were to adopt the suggested criterion 
of the importance of the alleged right we should invite endless litigation 
and confusion worse confounded.‖63  Relevant here, the Court noted that 
the supposedly ―substantial‖ and ―important‖ right that Sibbach sought 
to protect was not universally recognized, noting that ―state courts are 
divided as to the power in the absence of a statute to order a physical 
examination.‖64 
Instead, the Court held that ―the test‖ for whether a Federal Rule 
violates the Enabling Act ―must be whether a rule really regulates 
procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties 
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and 
redress for disregard or infraction of them.‖65  Rule 35 was valid, the 
Court held, because it was procedural.66  The Supreme Court did not 
 
 57. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9 (―The contention of [Sibbach], in final analysis, is that Rule[] 
35 . . . [is] not within the mandate of Congress to this court.‖). 
 58. See supra, note 21. 
 59. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11 (―[Plaintiff] admits, and, we think, correctly, that Rules 35 and 37 
are rules of procedure.‖). 
 60. Id. at 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (―I deem a requirement as to the invasion of the person 
to stand on a very different footing from questions pertaining to the discovery of documents, pre-trial 
procedure and other devises for the expeditious, economic and fair conduct of litigation.‖). 
 61. Id. at 11 (majority opinion). 
 62. Professor Allan Ides provides an excellent explanation of this procedural posture in his 2010 
article on Shady Grove.  Ides, supra note 21, at 7–10. 
 63. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Untangled from the procedural posture of the case, Justice Frankfurter in dissent made a 
compelling argument that Rules 35 and 37 did in fact exceed the scope of the Supreme Court‘s authority 
13
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address whether application of the Rule 35 would affect Sibbach‘s 
substantive rights as Sibbach did not make this argument.67 
2. Hanna v. Plumer 
The Supreme Court‘s next important decision on the Enabling Act 
was Hanna v. Plumer.68  There, the plaintiff, Eddie V. Hanna, was 
injured in automobile accident that occurred in South Carolina.69  She 
alleged that Louise Plumer Osgood was liable for her injuries.  Osgood 
had died after the automobile accident, but before Hanna filed her suit, 
so Hanna sued the executor of Osgood‘s estate, Edward M. Plumer. 
Plumer was purportedly served with notice of the lawsuit when copies 
of the summons and the complaint were left at his home with his wife.70  
This method of service was proper under Federal Rule of Civil 
 
to promulgate rules of practice and procedure.  Id. at 16–17 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Frankfurter 
argued that at stake was the ―inviolability of a person.‖  Id.  Instead of focusing on the ―abridge, enlarge 
or modify‖ limitation, Justice Frankfurter argued: 
So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public policy in a matter deeply touching 
the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to privacy, ought not to be inferred from a 
general authorization to formulate rules for the more uniform and effective dispatch of business 
on the civil side of the federal courts.   
Id. at 18.  Essentially, Justice Frankfurter argued that, regardless of the label attached to Rules 35 and 
37, the Rules affected an important right.  This is something akin to a separation-of-powers argument—
Congress, rather than the Court, should be decided an issue this important.  Cf. Indus. Union Dep't AFL-
CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (―This uncertainty, I 
would suggest, is eminently justified, since I believe that this litigation presents the Court with what has 
to be one of the most difficult issues that could confront a decisionmaker: whether the statistical 
possibility of future deaths should ever be disregarded in light of the economic costs of preventing those 
deaths.  I would also suggest that the widely varying positions advanced in the briefs of the parties and 
in the opinions of Mr. Justice Stevens, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Marshall 
demonstrate, perhaps better than any other fact, that Congress, the governmental body best suited and 
most obligated to make the choice confronting us in this litigation, has improperly delegated that choice 
to the Secretary of Labor and, derivatively, to this Court.‖). 
 67. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.  Sibbach‘s admission that Rules 35 and 37 were procedural 
foreclosed any argument under this test: ―[t]hat the rules in question are such is admitted.‖  Id.  
Professor Ely later suggested that the Supreme Court‘s Sibbach analysis was driven by the 
―comparatively primitive state of the Court‘s thinking, circa 1941.‖  Ely, supra note 11, at 735.  ―[B]y 
[the Court‘s] lights, either a Rule was procedural or it affected substantive rights.‖  Id. at 719. 
 68. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 69. Id. at 461. 
 70. Id. 
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Procedure 4(d)(1).71  But Massachusetts General Laws ch. 197, § 9 
required a plaintiff to serve an executor or administrator ―in hand.‖72 
Arguing that the service was improper under Massachusetts law, 
Plumer moved to dismiss the lawsuit.  The district court granted 
Plumer‘s motion to dismiss and the court of appeals affirmed, holding 
that ―relatively recent amendments to [the state service of process 
statute] evince a clear legislative purpose to require personal 
notification.‖73 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that in-hand service 
was not required.  The Court stated that Federal Rule 4(d)(1) ―relate[d] 
to ‗practice and procedure of the district courts‘‖74 because it 
―[p]rescrib[ed] the manner in which a defendant is to be notified that a 
suit has been instituted against him.‖75  The Court quoted the Sibbach 
language on the validity of a Federal Rule—―‗whether a rule really 
regulates procedure‘‖76—and held that Federal Rule 4(d)(1) ―clearly 
passe[d] muster.‖77  The analysis in Hanna shed little light on the 
meaning of the Enabling Act. 
The Hanna opinion is important, however, for making clear that the 
Enabling Act analysis is different than the Erie analysis and that the Erie 
analysis was not ―the appropriate test of the validity and therefore the 
 
 71. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1) (―The summons and complaint shall be served together. 
The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be 
made as follows: (1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a 
copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling 
house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing 
therein . . . .‖). 
 72. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958) (―Except as provided in this chapter, an 
executor or administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which is 
not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond for the performance of his trust, or to 
such an action which is commenced within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such 
action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator or service thereof 
accepted by him or a notice stating the name of the estate, the name and address of the creditor, the 
amount of the claim and the court in which the action has been brought has been filed in the proper 
registry of probate.‖). 
 73. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462. 
 74. Id. at 464. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 77. Id.  
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applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.‖78  A Federal Rule 
was different than non-statutory federal law as expounded by federal 
judges, according to the Hanna Court, because the Advisory Committee, 
the Supreme Court, and Congress had all made a judgment on the 
validity of a Federal Rule before it would become effective.79 
So after Hanna, it was clear that Erie did not govern a conflict 
between a state law and a Federal Rule.  Less clear, however, was the 
meaning of the ―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ limitation of the Enabling 
Act. 
C. Avoiding a Potential Conflict Between State Law and a Federal Rule 
One consequence of the Enabling Act‘s language is that the conflict 
between state law and a Federal Rule is resolved by classification of a 
law as substantive or procedural.  This precludes a court from 
accounting for the fairness considerations that underlie Erie‘s twin aims.  
To avoid the more rigid Enabling Act analysis, courts have at times 
interpreted the Federal Rule to avoid a conflict with state law.80  If there 
is no Federal Rule covering the matter in dispute, then any conflict is 
governed by the more flexible Erie analysis.  The Supreme Court has 
followed this approach in two important cases following Hanna. 
1. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., the Court analyzed whether a conflict 
 
 78. Id. at 469–70. 
 79. Id. at 471 (―[T]he question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided 
Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the 
Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in 
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.‖). 
 80. See, e.g., Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001).  But see 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) (―This is not to suggest that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‗direct collision‘ with state 
law.  The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning.  If a direct collision with state law arises 
from that plain meaning, then the analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.‖); Burlington N. R.R. 
Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (finding a conflict, in part, because ―[T]he purposes underlying the 
Rule are sufficiently coextensive with the asserted purposes of the Alabama statute to indicate that the 
Rule occupies the statute's field of operation so as to preclude its application in federal diversity 
actions.‖). 
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existed between a state law and a Federal Rule that both addressed when 
an action was ―commenced.‖81  This conflict was important because the 
relevant statute of limitations in Walker required a plaintiff to 
―commence[]‖ an action within two years of an injury. 
In this case, Fred N. Walker injured his eye when pieces of a nail he 
had hammered flew up into his face.  Walker alleged that the nail 
shattered because it was defectively manufactured by defendant, Armco 
Steel.82  Under Oklahoma law, Walker‘s suit was ―governed by a 2-year 
statute of limitations period.‖83  Walker filed his complaint and a 
summons was issued within two years of the accident.84  Importantly, 
however, merely filing an action did not satisfy the Oklahoma statute of 
limitations; rather, the statute of limitations was only satisfied after an 
action was ―commenced.‖85  Relevant here,86 the Oklahoma law stated 
that an action was not deemed ―commenced‖ for the purposes of the 
statute of limitations until the defendant was actually served: ―‗An 
action shall be deemed commenced, within the meaning of this article 
[the statute of limitations] . . . at the date of the summons which is 
served . . . .‘‖87  Armco Steel was not served until more than two years 
after the accident.88  Walker admitted that he had not timely commenced 
the action under Oklahoma law.89 
Walker argued instead that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—and 
not Oklahoma law—should govern when an action is commenced.90  
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, ―‗[a] civil action is 
commenced by filing a complaint with the court.‘‖91  Walker had filed 
 
 81. Walker, 446 U.S. at 742–43. 
 82. Id. at 741. 
 83. Id. at 742 n.3. 
 84. Id. at 742. 
 85. Id. at 742–43. 
 86. The Oklahoma statute of limitations also provided an exception to this general rule that 
commencement only occurred upon service on the defendant.  The action as deemed to have been 
commenced on the date of filing for the purposes of the statute of limitations if service was made on the 
defendant within sixty days of service.  Id. at 743.  Walker, however, did not comply with either the 
general rule or the exception.  See id. at 742–43. 
 87. Id. at 743 n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, § 97 (1971)). 
 88. Id. at 742. 
 89. Id. at 743. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 750 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 3). 
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his action within two years of his injury, and if Federal Rule 3 governed 
when an action was ―commenced,‖ Walker would have satisfied the 
applicable Oklahoma statute of limitations.92 
Although both rules seemed to govern when an action was 
―commenced,‖ the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule 3 and the 
Oklahoma law were not in conflict.93  The Court reasoned that Federal 
Rule 3 was not intended to have an effect on state statutes of limitations.  
Instead, Federal Rule 3 was intended to start the clock on various 
deadlines under the Federal Rules.94  In contrast, the Oklahoma law was 
a ―statement of a substantive decision by that State that actual service 
on, and accordingly actual notice by, the defendant is an integral part of 
the several policies served by the statute of limitations.‖95 
Because Federal Rule 3 did not replace the policy determinations in 
the Oklahoma statute, the Court held that the two rules could ―exist side 
by side[:] each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without 
conflict.‖96  The lack of a conflict dictated that case was governed by the 
Erie analysis.  Acknowledging that application of Federal Rule 3 ―might 
not create any problem of forum shopping,‖ the Court nonetheless held 
that the Oklahoma rule should apply: 
There is simply no reason why, in the absence of a controlling federal 
rule, an action based on state law which concededly would be barred in 
the state courts by the state statute of limitations should proceed through 
litigation to judgment in federal court solely because of the fortuity that 
there is diversity of citizenship between the litigants.
97
 
Arguably, however, Federal Rule 3 should have controlled when the 
action was ―commenced‖ for all purposes in federal court.98  Federal 
 
 92. See id. at 742–43. 
 93. Id. at 750. 
 94. Id. at 750–51 (internal footnotes and citations omitted) (―There is no indication that the Rule 
was intended to toll a state statute of limitations, much less that it purported to displace state tolling 
rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations.  In our view, in diversity actions Rule 3 governs the 
date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect state 
statutes of limitations.‖). 
 95. Id. at 751. 
 96. Id. at 752. 
 97. Id. at 753. 
 98. Others have also noted that Federal Rule does address tolling in federal question cases.  See 
Freer & Arthur, supra note 22, at 72 (citing West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987)). 
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Rule 3 applies to ―all civil actions and proceedings in the United States 
district courts.‖99  In stating the test for determining whether a conflict 
existed, the Court seemed to put a thumb on the no-conflict side of the 
scale—―[t]he . . . question must . . . be whether the scope of the Federal 
Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the 
Court.‖100  In a footnote, however, the Court claimed that it was not 
―suggest[ing] that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be 
narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‗direct collision‘ with state 
law.‖101 
2. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities 
Following the Walker case, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 
Inc., the Supreme Court expressly recognized the practice of 
―interpret[ing] the federal rules to avoid conflict with important state 
regulatory policies.‖102 
There, William Gasperini had taken photographs in Central America 
as a journalist, and had lent 300 of the original color transparencies of 
the photographs to the Center for Humanities.103  The Center used the 
transparencies to make an educational video about conflict in Central 
America.104  When Gasperini asked for the transparencies back, the 
Center for Humanities could not locate them.105  Gasperini sued and was 
awarded $450,000 in compensatory damages, or $1,500 for each of the 
transparencies.106 
The Center for Humanities argued that this verdict should be 
 
 99. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 100. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 749–50.  Discussing the Walker case, Freer and Arthur observe that, 
―even though unwilling to own up to it, the court pretty clearly applied a substantive canon of 
construction: if possible, read Federal Rules narrowly to avoid trenching on state substantive interest 
and thus avoid raising serious issues under § 2072(b).‖  Freer & Arthur, supra note 22, at 72. 
 101. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9. 
 102. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996) (citations and internal 
quotations marks omitted). 
 103. Id. at 419. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 420. 
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overturned because it was excessive.107  Under a New York law, a judge 
had authority to overturn a jury verdict that ―deviate[d] materially from 
what would be reasonable compensation.‖108  Prior to the enactment of 
New York‘s ―deviates materially‖ statute, federal courts had recognized 
a judge‘s power to overturn a jury‘s verdict under Federal Rule 59.109  
Under Federal Rule 59, a judge had authority to overturn a jury verdict 
when ―it [wa]s quite clear that the jury ha[d] reached a seriously 
erroneous result [and] letting the verdict stand would result in a 
miscarriage of justice.‖110 
The Court held that these two standards were not in conflict, stating 
that, ―[w]hether damages are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be 
governed by some law [a]nd there is no candidate for that governance 
other than the law that gives rise to the claim for relief—here, the law of 
New York.‖111  The Court supported this interpretation by citing to 
authority stating that the ―Court ‗ha[d] continued since [Hanna] to 
interpret the federal rules to avoid conflict with important state 
regulatory policies.‘‖112 
Under the Court‘s interpretation, the deviates materially statute did 
not conflict with Federal Rule 59; instead, the statute conflicted with the 
non-statutory federal law standard for granting a new trial.  The Court, 
therefore, applied the Erie analysis and concluded that the federal 
district court was required to use the New York State‘s ―deviates 
materially‖ standard.113 
To summarize, before Shady Grove, there were three relevant lines of 
cases on the conflict between non-statutory federal law and state law: 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 423–24.  This statute was apparently motivated by runaway juries.  See Bauer, supra 
note 4, at 26 (―There was considerable evidence that this statute had been adopted in response to 
perceived excessive verdicts by ‗runaway‘ juries.‖). 
 109. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a) (―The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the 
issues . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action 
at law in federal court.‖); see Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing federal 
practice under Federal Rule 59). 
 110. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  But see id. at 437 n.22 (majority 
opinion). 
 111. Id. at 437 n.22 (majority opinion). 
 112. Id. (quoting R. FALLON, D. MELTZER, & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 729–30 (4th ed. 1996)). 
 113. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 439. 
20
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/1
2011] FOR LACK OF A BETTER RULE 21 
(1) Erie and its progeny, which required a court to resolve a conflict 
between federal common law and state law through consideration of 
Erie‘s twin aims; (2) Sibbach and its progeny, which offered a really 
regulates procedure test—and almost nothing else—to resolve a conflict 
between a Federal Rule and a conflicting state law; and (3) Walker and 
Gasperini, which acknowledged the practice of interpreting a Federal 
Rule to avoid a conflict with important state policies. 
III. SHADY GROVE 
A. Background of Shady Grove 
Coincidentally, like the important Enabling Act cases that preceded it, 
Shady Grove involved an automobile accident.114  Sonia E. Galvez 
suffered injuries in that automobile accident and then received medical 
treatment from Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates.115  Galvez had an 
insurance policy with the Allstate Insurance Co. to cover the care that 
Shady Grove provided.116 
Under New York law, an insurance company like Allstate had 30 
days from the treatment to pay Shady Grove.117  If an insurance 
company missed this deadline, it was required to pay 2% interest per 
month on the late payments.  Allstate did pay Shady Grove, but Allstate 
paid late and did not pay the 2% interest.118 
Shady Grove brought suit in federal district court in New York to 
collect the statutory interest.  In addition to the facts outlined above, 
Shady Grove also alleged that ―Allstate routinely refuse[d] to pay 
interest on overdue benefits.‖119  Shady Grove, therefore, sought to act 
as a class representative for all others that Allstate failed to pay the 
statutory interest to.120 
 
 114. Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 115. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (2010). 
 116. Id.  As partial compensation for the medical treatment, Galvez gave her rights to insurance 
benefits under a policy she had with Allstate.  Id. 
 117. Id. at 1436–37. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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Allstate sought to dismiss Shady Grove‘s class action claim, arguing 
that New York Civil Practice Law § 901(b) prohibited class treatment.121  
Section 901(b) ―prohibit[ed] class actions in suits seeking penalties or 
statutory minimum damages.‖122  The interest on the unpaid insurance 
payments that Shady Grove sought to recover was a penalty or statutory 
minimum under § 901(b).123  In a New York state court, then, § 901(b) 
would have precluded class treatment of Shady Grove‘s claim.124 
Shady Grove, however, argued that § 901(b)‘s limitation did not 
apply to its claim.  Rather, because Shady Grove had sued in federal 
court, Federal Rule 23 governed whether it could maintain a class 
action.  Unlike New York‘s § 901(b), Federal Rule 23 contained no 
limitation on class actions that sought a penalty or statutory interest.125  
Arguably, then, Federal Rule 23 allowed class treatment of Shady 
Grove‘s claim.  Allstate responded that application of Federal Rule 23 
instead of New York‘s § 901(b) would abridge, enlarge, or modify 
Allstate‘s substantive rights in violation of the Enabling Act.126 
To resolve whether New York‘s § 901(b) or Federal Rule 23 
governed, the Supreme Court had to decide (1) whether § 901(b) and 
Federal Rule 23 were in conflict; and, if so, (2) how the ―abridge, 
enlarge or modify‖ limitation actually limited the Supreme Court‘s 
 
 121. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2008).  
The procedural posture of the case requires a brief explanation.  Shady Grove brought its claim in 
federal district court as a class action.  Shady Grove‘s complaint raised no federal question and, on its 
own, Shady Grove‘s claim did not meet 28 U.S.C. § 1332‘s jurisdictional minimum of $75,000 in 
controversy.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).  Instead, Shady Grove invoked jurisdiction under the Class 
Action Fairness Act: ―[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a 
class action in which . . . any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any 
defendant.‖  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).  If Allstate could show that Shady Grove‘s claim could not be 
brought as a class action, then the federal court would be required to dismiss the claim for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 122. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436. 
 123. See id. at 1437. 
 124. See id. (noting that federal district court had ―[c]onclud[ed] that statutory interest [wa]s a 
‗penalty‘ under New York law, [and] held that § 901(b) prohibited the proposed class action‖). 
 125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 126. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 31, Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008)) (noting that Allstate 
argued that application of Rule 23 over § 901(b) was not ―substantively neutral‖ and would abridge the 
―‗substantive right . . . not to be subjected to aggregated class-action liability‖ in a single suit‖). 
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rulemaking authority. 
B. The “Really Regulates Procedure” Approach 
To answer whether Federal Rule 23 and § 901(b) were in conflict, 
Justice Scalia focused on the ―question in dispute‖127—―whether Shady 
Grove‘s suit may proceed as a class action.‖128  Rule 23 answered that 
question: ―By its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule entitling a 
plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a 
class action.‖129  Section 901(b) also answered ―the same question.‖130  
The two, therefore, were in conflict,131 and no reasonable interpretation 
of Federal Rule 23 could avoid the conflict.132  This conflict required the 
court to ―confront head-on whether Rule 23 f[ell] within [the Enabling 
Act‘s] statutory authorization.‖133 
As stated above, the Enabling Act vested the Supreme Court with 
authority to promulgate rules of procedure (subject to congressional 
approval) ―but with the limitation that those rules ‗shall not abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right.‘‖134  Justice Scalia, following 
Sibbach, stated that ―this limitation means that the Rule must ‗really 
regulate[] procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and 
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering 
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.‘‖135  The Federal 
Rule, Justice Scalia argued, must control if it ―governs . . . ‗the manner 
and the means‘ by which the litigants‘ rights are ‗enforced.‘‖136  
Importantly, this approach did not leave any room for consideration of 
the displaced state law: the ―substantive nature‖ or ―substantive 
purpose‖ of the state rule that the Federal Rule will displace ―makes no 
 
 127. Id. at 1437.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1441 (―[E]ven artificial narrowing cannot render § 901(b) compatible with Rule 23.‖). 
 133. Id. at 1442. 
 134. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006)). 
 135. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 136. Id. at 1442 (quoting Miss. Publ‘g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)). 
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difference.‖137 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that his approach was ―hard to square 
with [the Enabling Act‘s] terms.‖138  Said another way, he concluded 
that ―it is hard to understand how it can be determined whether a Federal 
Rule ‗abridges‘ or ‗modifies‘ substantive rights without knowing what 
state-created rights would obtain if the Federal Rule did not exist.‖139  
Although, potentially inconsistent with the language of the Enabling 
Act, Justice Scalia argued that his approach was ―driven by the very real 
concern that Federal Rules which vary from State to State would be 
chaos.‖140 
C. The “Intertwined” Approach 
Writing separately in a concurrence, Justice Stevens agreed with 
much of Justice Scalia‘s opinion.  To start, he agreed with Justice Scalia 
that the conflict between § 901(b) and Federal Rule 23 was 
unavoidable.141  Although he acknowledged that a court should avoid an 
unnecessary conflict between a Federal Rule and a state law, he argued 
that, ―[s]imply because a rule should be read in light of federalism 
concerns, it does not follow that courts may rewrite the rule.‖142 
Justice Stevens, however, disagreed with Justice Scalia‘s 
interpretation of the Sibbach case.  Justice Stevens argued that Justice 
 
 137. Id. at 1444. 
 138. Id. at 1446. 
 139. Id. at 1445–46. 
 140. Id. at 1431, 1446 (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13–14).  Justice Scalia also argued that his 
approach was required by Sibbach—i.e., Sibbach‘s really regulates procedure test did not allow 
consideration of state law and the test ―ha[d] been settled law . . . for nearly seven decades.‖  Id. at 1446.  
Justice Stevens (and others) have made a compelling argument that Justice Scalia‘s broad interpretation 
of Sibbach‘s really regulates procedure test is not required by Sibbach itself.  See Ides, supra note 21.  
Professor Ides points out that, for a variety of reasons, Sibbach did not argue that the right to be free 
from a physical examination was substantive and made a only ―facial‖ challenge to the validity of 
Federal Rule 35.  Id. at 15.  In light of these aspects of the Sibbach case, if one assumes that Justice 
Scalia‘s interpretation of the really regulates procedure test is correct, the test ―provides at best a cryptic 
and elliptical way of announcing a rather bold and superfluous interpretation of § 2072(b).‖  Id.  For this 
reason and others, Professor Ides has convincingly shown that the Sibbach really regulates procedure 
test does not compel the result that Justice Scalia reaches in Shady Grove.  Id. at 16 (―Thus, if the 
question is one of statutory construction or stare decisis, Justice Stevens was plainly correct.‖). 
 141. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 142. Id. 
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Scalia‘s application of the really regulates procedure test ―ignore[d] the 
[Enabling Act‘s] . . . limitation that such rules . . . ‗not abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right.‘‖143  Where Justice Scalia argued that a 
Federal Rule was valid if it ―really regulate[d] procedure,‖ Justice 
Stevens argued that the procedural nature of a Federal Rule was only the 
first requirement for validity under the Enabling Act. 
Justice Stevens criticized the really regulates procedure approach for 
valuing ease of application over fidelity to statutory text, stating that, 
―[a]lthough Justice Scalia may generally prefer easily administrable, 
bright-line rules, his preference does not give us license to adopt a 
second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act‖; Justice Stevens 
continued that ―[c]ourts cannot ignore text and context in the service of 
simplicity.‖144 
Justice Stevens read the Enabling Act to involve two requirements.  
First, to be valid under § 2072(a), a rule must be a ―general rule[] of 
practice [or] procedure.‖145  Second, to be valid under § 2072(b), the 
rule must not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.146  
Justice Stevens argued that the really regulates procedure approach only 
spoke to § 2072(a) ―[b]ut it ignore[d] the second limitation that such 
rules also ‗not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.‘‖147 
 Giving meaning to the Enabling Act‘s abridge, modify, or enlarge 
limitation, Justice Stevens argued that a Federal Rule ―cannot govern a 
particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that is 
procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a 
state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-
created right.‖148  For brevity‘s sake, this Article will refer to this 
approach as the ―intertwined‖ approach.  Although noting that, ―[i]t will 
be rare‖ that a state law will satisfy this intertwined approach,149 Justice 
 
 143. Id. at 1452–53. 
 144. Id. at 1454. 
 145. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006); see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 146. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b); see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452–53 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 147. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452–53 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(b)). 
 148. Id. at 1452. 
 149. Id. at 1454 n.10; id. at 1455 (―Although most state rules bearing on the litigation process are 
adopted for some policy reason, few seemingly ‗procedural‘ rules define the scope of a substantive right 
or remedy.‖). 
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Stevens provided little additional guidance of the meaning of his test. 
Justice Scalia characterized Justice Stevens‘ intertwined approach as 
―inscrutable,‖150 arguing that Stevens‘ ―approach will present hundreds 
of hard questions, forcing federal courts to assess the substantive or 
procedural character of countless state rules that may conflict with a 
single Federal Rule.‖151  As support, Justice Scalia pointed to Justice 
Stevens‘ drawn out application of the intertwined approach in the Shady 
Grove opinion itself, which required an examination of the legislative 
history and context of § 901(b).152  According to Justice Stevens, 
however, even if his approach was more difficult to apply, his ―inquiry 
[wa]s what the Enabling Act requires.‖153 
D. The “Deferential Interpretation” Approach 
The disagreement between Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens turned 
on the meaning of the Enabling Act‘s ―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ 
limitation and the relative importance of an easily administrable rule 
versus fidelity to statutory text.  Justice Ginsburg, however, criticized 
both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens for their answer to an antecedent 
question: ―Is this conflict really necessary?‖154 
Justice Ginsburg, with the support of three other justices, argued that 
Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens were wrong in the interpretation of 
Rule 23.  In essence, Justice Ginsburg disagreed with Justice Scalia and 
Justice Stevens on whether Rule 23 was ambiguous enough to allow 
state interests to affect its interpretation.  According to Justice Ginsburg, 
the Court ―read[] Rule 23 relentlessly to override New York‘s restriction 
on the availability of statutory damages.‖155  Justice Ginsburg argued 
that the Court should interpret a Federal Rule with ―‗sensitivity to 
important state interests to avoid conflict with important state regulatory 
 
 150. Id. at 1447 n.14 (plurality opinion). 
 151. Id. at 1447. 
 152. Id. at 1447 n.15 (internal citation omitted) (―Walking through the concurrence‘s application 
of its test to § 901(b) gives little reason to hope that its approach will lighten the burden for lower 
courts.‖). 
 153. Id. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 154. Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really 
Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657 (1959)). 
 155. Id. 
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policies.‘‖156  For brevity‘s sake, this Article will refer to this as the 
―deferential interpretation‖ approach. 
Disputes over whether to apply state law or non-statutory federal law 
only arise when application of one over the other would change the 
outcome in a case—i.e., some difference between state law and federal 
non-statutory law would cause a different result.  (If the result were not 
different, parties would have no motivation to argue for the application 
of one over the other.)  Resolution of these disputes depends on whether 
the federal non-statutory law is judge made or a Federal Rule.  When a 
court limits the scope of a Federal Rule to avoid a conflict with a state 
law, the conflict will not be governed by the Enabling Act.  But even 
with the Federal Rule thus limited, there is still an extant conflict 
between the state law and some non-statutory federal law that is causing 
a different outcome in federal court.  This extant conflict must be 
governed by the Erie analysis. 
The deferential interpretation approach, therefore, allows a court to 
resolve the conflict by reference to Erie‘s twin aims.  The more flexible 
Erie approach defers to the authority of state legislatures and values 
federalism.157  According to Justice Ginsburg, the effect of a broad 
interpretation of Rule 23 in Shady Grove was to undercut ―New York‘s 
legitimate interest in keeping certain monetary awards reasonably 
bounded.‖158 
Both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens argued that Justice Ginsburg‘s 
deferential interpretation approach would rewrite Federal Rule 23.159  
Justice Scalia argued that the deferential interpretation approach was 
actually counterproductive, stating that ―[t]he dissent‘s concern for state 
prerogatives is frustrated rather than furthered by revising state laws 
when a potential conflict with a Federal Rule arises; the state-friendly 
approach would be to accept the law as written and test the validity of 
 
 156. Id. (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7, 438 n.22 (1996)). 
 157. Id. at 1464 (―Our decisions instruct over and over again that, in the adjudication of diversity 
cases, state interests—whether advanced in a statute, or a procedural rule—warrant our respectful 
consideration.‖) (internal citations omitted). 
 158. Id. at 1460. 
 159. Id. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (―We cannot contort [Rule 23‘s] text, even to avert a collision 
with state law that might render it invalid.‖); id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring) (―Simply because a 
rule should be read in light of federalism concerns, it does not follow that courts may rewrite the rule.‖). 
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the Federal Rule.‖160  Justice Stevens stated that, ―[a]t bottom, the 
dissent‘s interpretation of Rule 23 seems to be that Rule 23 covers only 
those cases in which its application would create no Erie problem.‖161 
The three proposed approaches reflect the relative weight that the 
justices assigned to the policy issues underlying the Shady Grove case: 
Justice Scalia favored an approach that would be easily administrable, 
Justice Stevens favored an approach that was most consistent with the 
text of the Enabling Act, and Justice Ginsburg favored an approach that 
was deferential to state legislatures. 
E. After Shady Grove 
As others have noted, Shady Grove solved almost nothing162: ―Shady 
Grove‘s fractured opinions suggest the need to reconsider the problem 
from the ground up.‖163  No opinion in Shady Grove garnered a majority 
of five votes.  Under the rule announced in Marks v. United States, 
―[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices ‗the holding of the 
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.‘‖164 
Following Shady Grove, most commentators and courts have 
assumed that the ―narrowest‖ grounds was Justice Stevens‘ intertwined 
approach.165  The Marks doctrine, however, is not always easy to 
 
 160. Id. at 1440 (plurality opinion). 
 161. Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 162. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 5. 
 163. Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 880. 
 164. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
169 n.15 (1976)). 
 165. See Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Sorting out an Erie sequel, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 31, 2010, 
1:16 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/analysis-sorting-out-an-erie-sequel/ (―Stevens‘ view on 
this general point becomes controlling through the practice of the Court, when its nine members are 
deeply divided, of treating the narrowest view supporting the outcome as the controlling interpretation, 
in a legal sense.‖); McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 747 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (―Because 
Justice Stevens‘ concurring opinion would permit some state law provisions addressing class actions—
whereas Justice Scalia‘s opinion in Part II-B (which only had the support of four Justices) would 
broadly prohibit any state law that conflicted with Rule 23—Justice Stevens‘ opinion is the narrowest 
and, thus, controlling opinion.‖); Estate of CA v. Grier, 752 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (S.D. Tex. 2010) 
(―Justice Stevens's opinion, as the narrower opinion, controls.‖). 
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apply166 and it is not clear that Justice Stevens‘ approach is the 
narrowest, i.e., ―fit[s] entirely within a broader circle drawn by‖ Justice 
Scalia.167  Even if courts do all agree that Justice Stevens‘ approach is 
controlling, the meaning of Justice Stevens‘ approach is unclear.  Justice 
Stevens indicated that it would be ―rare‖ that ―a state law . . . [wa]s 
procedural in the ordinary use of the term but [wa]s so intertwined with 
a state right or remedy that it function[ed] to define the scope of the 
state-created right.‖168  But Justice Stevens gave no examples of state 
laws that would satisfy the intertwined approach.169 
Further, although five members of the Court agreed that there was a 
conflict between § 901(b) and Federal Rule 23, the extent to which 
courts should shade the interpretation of a Federal Rule to avoid a 
conflict remains unclear.  Justice Scalia argued that the Court ―should 
read an ambiguous Federal Rule to avoid ‗substantial variations [in 
outcomes] between state and federal litigation . . . because it is 
 
 166. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994) (―We think it not useful to pursue 
the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the 
lower courts that have considered [its application to Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980)].‖). 
 167. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  Courts have proposed several 
definitions of ―narrowest.‖  See Joseph M. Cacace, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the 
United States: A Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 97, 110–13 (2007) (describing several of the various definitions of ―narrowest‖ that have been 
proposed).  In King, the court has stated that the opinion is narrowest if it ―represent[s] a common 
denominator of the Court‘s reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly approved by at least five 
Justices who support the judgment.‖  King, 950 F.2d at 781.  Further, the court noted that 
―[w]hen . . . one opinion supporting the judgment does not fit entirely within the broader circle drawn by 
the others, Marks is problematic.‖  Id. at 782.  Further, ―[w]hen eight of nine Justices do not subscribe to 
a given approach to a legal question, it surely cannot be proper to endow that approach with controlling 
force, no matter how persuasive it may be.‖  Id.  Another court has argued that the opinion is narrowest 
that rests on the ground ―that is most nearly confined to the precise fact situation before the Court, rather 
than to a ground that states more general rules.‖  United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 872–73 (1981). 
 168. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452, 1454 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 169. One possibility is that the ―intertwined‖ approach requires something roughly equivalent to 
the ―bitter with the sweet‖ approach of the 1974 Supreme Court case Arnett v. Kennedy.  Cf. 416 U.S. 
134, 153–54 (1974) (―[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the 
limitations on the procedure which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant . . . must take 
the bitter with the sweet.‖).  It should be noted that the ―bitter with the sweet‖ approach was later 
rejected.  Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (―In light of these holdings, it is 
settled that the ‗bitter with the sweet‘ approach misconceives the constitutional guarantee.‖).  For 
example, a procedural rule may be sufficiently ―intertwined‖ with a substantive right to violate the 
Enabling Act when ―the very section of the statute which granted‖ the substantive right ―expressly 
provided also for the procedure by which‖ the right should be enforced.  Cf. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 152. 
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reasonable to assume that ‗Congress is just as concerned as we have 
been to avoid significant differences between state and federal courts in 
adjudicating claims.‘‖170  Although Justice Stevens agreed with Justice 
Scalia that there was a conflict, he agreed with the dissent that a court 
should ―avoid immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that 
would trench on state prerogatives.‖171  The extent to which a court‘s 
interpretation of a Federal Rule should be affected by a conflicting state 
policy, therefore, is still very much unsettled. 
Courts and litigants are left without guidance.  This lack of guidance 
creates a real need for an approach that can accommodate the various 
policy interests that divided the Justices in Shady Grove.  Below, this 
Article will describe a new approach, referred to as the ―state-law 
transsubstantivity‖ approach.  After describing the approach, this Article 
will demonstrate how the analysis would function in practice with 
example cases. 
IV. ―STATE-LAW TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY‖ 
Briefly summarized, the ―state-law transsubstantivity‖ approach is a 
new solution to test whether application of a Federal Rule instead of a 
conflicting state law would violate the Enabling Act‘s ―abridge, enlarge 
or modify‖ limitation.172  Once a court determines that a state law and a 
Federal Rule are in conflict, the court must examine the nature of the 
state law to determine whether the state law is substantive or procedural.  
This approach defines ―procedural‖ as ―transsubstantive‖ and defines 
―substantive‖ as ―any law that lacks transsubstantivity.‖  If a state law is 
not transsubstantive—i.e., if the state law only applies to a particular 
 
 170. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 n.7.  Justice Scalia states that ―there is only one reasonable 
reading of Rule 23‖ and that is in conflict with § 901(b).  Id.  But Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court 
unnecessarily read into Rule 23 a conflict with § 901(b).  Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―The 
Court reads Rule 23 relentlessly to override New York's restriction on the availability of statutory 
damages.‖). 
 171. Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 172. This approach assumes that the federal rule in question will comply with § 2072(a)‘s 
requirement that the federal rule is a ―general rule[] of practice [or] procedure.‖  28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) 
(2006).  This is the first and only step for testing the validity of a Federal Rule under Justice Scalia‘s 
really regulates procedure approach.  See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1446 (noting the ―single hard 
question of whether a Federal Rule regulates substance or procedure‖). 
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type of claim—then the state law is presumed to create or define some 
substantive right, such that a failure to apply the state law would 
―abridge, enlarge or modify a[] substantive right.‖173  Conversely, if a 
state law is transsubstantive—i.e., if a state law applies to all types of 
claims—then the state law is procedural and the court should apply the 
Federal Rule. 
This approach would apply to Shady Grove as follows.  Assuming 
that in Shady Grove there was a conflict between § 901(b) and Federal 
Rule 23, the Court should have proceeded to examine the nature of the 
§ 901.  Section 901(a) states that ―[o]ne or more members of a class may 
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all‖ if the class 
meets certain prerequisites.174  Section 901(a) is transsubstantive and 
applies to all claims; stated another way, all claims that meet the 
prerequisites may be brought as a class action.  Were the conflict in 
Shady Grove between § 901(a) and Federal Rule 23, Federal Rule 23 
would govern as § 901(a) is transsubstantive and purely procedural—
allowing a Federal Rule to trump a state procedural law is 
unproblematic under the Enabling Act.175 
But § 901(b), in contrast, plucks a particular type of claim out from 
§ 901(a)‘s transsubstantive treatment and provides a special rule: 
―Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure 
of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in class action, 
an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created 
or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.‖176  
Section 901(b), because it is not transsubstantive, is not purely 
procedural; therefore, it is presumed to create or define some substantive 
 
 173. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
 174. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(a) (McKinney 2006). 
 175. Not all possible statutes fall comfortably within the framework that I have proposed.  Take, 
for example, the following statute: ―Claims that do not seek statutory damages may proceed as a class 
action if the claim meets certain prerequisites.‖  This hypothetical statute would be functionally identical 
to the actual 901(a) and (b).  This hypothetical statute is difficult to place within the framework that I 
have proposed because it is essentially both transsubstantive (it creates a general rule applicable to all 
claims) and not transsubstantive (it singles out a particular type of claim for special treatment at the 
same time.  In such a situation, it may be necessary to separate the part of a law that is transsubstantive 
from the part of a law that is not transsubstantive. 
 176. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2006). 
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right.177  Application of a Federal Rule that conflicts with § 901(b), will 
thus abridge, enlarge, or modify178 a substantive right. 
As argued above, the fractured result in Shady Grove was driven by 
three different policy considerations at stake: (1) ease of administration, 
(2) fidelity to the Enabling Act text, and (3) deference to important state 
interests.  Below, this Article will explain how the state-law 
transsubstantivity approach better accommodates all three of these 
interests. 
A. Ease of Administration 
Justice Scalia‘s really regulates procedure approach involves only an 
examination of whether the Federal Rule regulates procedure.179  This 
approach is easy to administer because a court avoids examination of 
―the idiosyncrasies of state law.‖180 
Because the state-law transsubstantivity approach requires an 
examination of state law, it arguably lacks the administrative ease of 
Justice Scalia‘s really regulates procedure approach.  However, 
determining whether a state law is transsubstantive—the only 
examination of a state law required under the state-law 
transsubstantivity approach—does not require an examination of 
―idiosyncrasies‖181 or, potentially even more taxing on courts, an 
examination of state legislative history.182  Justice Scalia‘s rejection of 
an approach that examines the nature of the conflicting state law is 
 
 177. This point—that a law must be substantive if it is not purely procedural—is not an obvious 
one but will be further developed infra Part III.B. 
 178. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 179. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Miss. Publ‘g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)) (―What 
matters is what the rule itself regulates: If it governs only ‗the manner and the means‘ by which the 
litigants‘ rights are ‗enforced,‘ it is valid; if it alters ‗the rules of decision by which [the] court will 
adjudicate [those] rights,‘ it is not.‖)). 
 180. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445; id. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring) (criticizing the plurality 
opinion and noting that, ―Although, Justice Scalia may generally prefer easily administrable, bright-line 
rules, his preference does not give us license to adopt a second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling 
Act.  Courts cannot ignore text and context in the service of simplicity.‖). 
 181. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445 (plurality opinion). 
 182. Cf. id. at 1441 (criticizing Justice Ginsburg‘s reliance on state legislative history to determine 
the purpose of a state law). 
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premised on the assumption that the examination will be taxing—i.e., 
determining the nature of a state law would present a ―hard 
question[].‖183  If the examination of state law is simple, Justice Scalia‘s 
criticism of any approach that examines state law is unpersuasive.184 
Transsubstantivity is readily apparent.  A law is transsubstantive ―if it 
applies equally to all cases regardless of substance.‖185  When this is the 
only relevant information about a state law, determining the ―nature‖ of 
the state law is as simple as reading the law.  Accordingly, although the 
state-law transsubstantivity approach does require an examination of 
state law, the additional burden this examination imposes on courts or 
litigants is slight.  The state-law transsubstantivity approach, therefore, 
is not materially more difficult to administer than the really regulates 
procedure approach. 
B. Fidelity to the Enabling Act Text 
Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia‘s really regulates procedure 
approach as a ―second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act.‖186  
Stevens argued that the really regulates procedure approach, by 
precluding examination of the conflicting state law, ―ignore[d] the 
[Enabling Act‘s] limitation that [a Federal Rule] ‗not abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right.‘‖187  As will be explained below, without 
sacrificing ease of administration, the state-law transsubstantivity 
approach is consistent with the language of the Enabling Act. 
 
 183. See id. at 1447 (criticizing Justice Stevens‘ ―intertwined‖ approach as ―present[ing] hundreds 
of hard questions, forcing federal courts to assess the substantive or procedural character of countless 
state rules that may conflict with a single Federal Rule‖). 
 184. There is a potential benefit from the uncertainty that this will cause—litigants will be limited 
to the extent that they are able to forum shop.  If a litigant does not know how a court will decide a 
particular issue, a litigant cannot shop for that forum.  But eliminating forum-shopping can be better 
achieved with appropriate deference to state legislative judgments. 
 185. Marcus, supra note 23, at 376. 
 186. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 187. Id. at 1452–53 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)) (emphasis removed). 
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1. The Language of the Enabling Act Requires Consideration of the 
Conflicting State Law 
The phrase ―abridge, enlarge or modify‖188 requires a comparison.  It 
is not possible to know if a substantive right will be enlarged or 
modified by a Federal Rule without first knowing the scope of that 
substantive right.  This language demands that a court examine the 
scope of the substantive right embodied in the to-be displaced state law 
to determine whether application of the Federal Rule will cause the right 
to be abridged, enlarged, or modified.  Justice Scalia all but admits that 
this is the correct reading of the Enabling Act, acknowledging that  ―it is 
hard to understand how it can be determined whether a Federal Rule 
‗abridges‘ or ‗modifies‘ substantive rights without knowing what state-
created rights would obtain if the Federal Rule did not exist.‖189 
Professor Allan Ides, however, has noted that, ―if one reads the phrase 
‗really regulates procedure‘ in isolation, one can certainly construct an 
argument that Sibbach melded the two requirements of the [Enabling 
Act] into a single standard, one that focuses entirely on the procedural 
character of the Federal Rule.‖190  The argument that Ides suggests 
would require the following assumption: a rule that is procedural can 
only actually conflict with other procedural rules.  Under such an 
assumption, once a Federal Rule is found to really regulate procedure, 
any state law that conflicts with the Federal Rule must also be 
procedural.  Therefore, because the conflicting law is procedural, 
allowing the Federal Rule to trump to the conflicting state law would not 
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.  
Although this argument is tenable, an argument can be made that the 
structure of § 2072 indicates that Congress did not hold the critical 
assumption.191  Specifically, if Congress believed that any state law 
must be procedural when it conflicts with a Federal Rule that is 
 
 188. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
 189. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445–46. 
 190. Ides, supra note 21, at 14. 
 191. It must also be noted that Professor Stephen Burbank has persuasively argued the Congress 
did not intend the substance–procedure dichotomy to speak to a conflict between federal and state law.  
Rather, Professor Burbank has argued that ―the procedure/substance dichotomy . . . was intended to 
allocate lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress.‖  Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1106 (1982). 
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determined to be procedural, Congress would not have needed to 
include § 2072(b)‘s ―abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right‖ 
language.  The Enabling Act‘s text, then, suggests that the to-be 
displaced state law must be examined. 
2. Defining Procedural as Transsubstantive 
The required examination of the to-be displaced state law must 
determine whether the state law is substantive or procedural.  The 
Enabling Act vests the Supreme Court with authority to promulgate 
general rules of practice and procedure but prohibits a Federal Rule 
from ―abridge[ing], enlarge[ing] or modify[ing] any substantive 
right.‖192  A Federal Rule that trumps a state procedural law is therefore 
unproblematic under the Enabling Act.  Determining whether 
application of a Federal Rule over a conflicting state law is problematic 
under the Enabling Act requires a court to determine whether the 
conflicting state law is substantive or procedural.193 
a. Previous Attempts to Distinguish Between Substance and Procedure 
Courts and commentators have struggled to find a line that separates 
substance and procedure.194  Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Sibbach, 
even questioned whether substance and procedure ―are mutually 
exclusive categories with easily ascertainable contents.‖195  Although 
 
 192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (emphasis added). 
 193. It should be noted, however, that some have questioned whether the Enabling Act actually 
requires defining a law as substantive or procedural.  See Bauer, supra note 4, at 31 (―[T]here is 
something inherently problematic about having a result driven solely by a definitional label . . . rather 
than by also undertaking some analysis of the legislative purpose behind the [Enabling Act], including 
cabining the law-making role of the Supreme Court, and Congress‘ use of certain language to effect that 
purpose.‖). 
 194. Historically, substance and procedure were joined together.  See Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 
882 (―For centuries the Anglo-American tradition thoroughly integrated and interwove rules of 
‗procedure‘ (understood to be the rules by which courts and other adjudicatory bodies resolve legal 
disputes) and rules of ‗substance‘ (understood to be the rules to which citizens were supposed to 
conform their conduct outside of the courtroom).‖). 
 195. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 17 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
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this has proven to be a difficult task,196 categorizing a law as a 
substantive or procedural is necessary because ―they are the terms that 
Enabling Act uses.‖197 
Past attempts at drawing the line between substance and procedure 
have proved unworkable.  Concurring in the Hanna case, Justice Harlan 
suggested that a law was substantive if it ―affect[ed] those primary 
decisions respecting human conduct.‖198  Roughly, this definition 
suggests that a law is substantive if it affects matters outside of the court 
and it is procedural if it affects matters at the courthouse door or once 
inside.199  For example, a law that considers an individual a trespasser 
(and therefore generally responsible for protecting his or her own safety) 
when walking next to a railroad track will cause that individual to be 
very careful on the path when a train approaches.200  What an individual 
does when walking on a path by a railroad track is easily conceived of as 
―human conduct‖ and is, therefore, substantive. 
This ―human conduct‖ definition would not solve all conflicts 
between a state law and a Federal Rule.  One example where the 
definition fails is in its application to the bond requirement in the 1949 
Supreme Court case Cohen v. Industrial Loan Corp.201  In Cohen, New 
 
 196. See Bauer, supra note 4, at 7–8 (―[E]ven after seventy-plus years, the Court has been unable 
to come up with definitions of ‗procedural‘ and ‗substantive‘ which predictably resolve that 
distinction.‖). 
 197. Ely, supra note 11, at 724.  It should also be noted that ―substance‖ and ―procedure‖ do not 
have intrinsic definitions that apply in all situations: 
A particular issue may be classified as substantive or procedural in three contexts: when 
determining whether it is within the scope of a court‘s rulemaking power; when resolving 
questions of conflict of laws; or when determining whether to apply state law or federal law.  
These three contexts present three very different kinds of problems, and factors that are of 
decisive importance in making the substance-procedure classification for one context may be 
irrelevant in the other contexts.  To use the same terminology for all three contexts is an 
invitation to a barren and misleading conceptualism, in which a decision classifying a particular 
issue as substantive in one of these contexts could be misinterpreted to classify the issue as 
substantive in another context even though an entirely different purpose is involved. 
19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4508. 
 198. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 199. See Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 882 (noting that procedure is ―understood to be the rules by 
which courts . . . resolve legal disputes‖ and that substance is ―understood to be the rules to which 
citizens were supposed to conform their conduct outside of the courtroom‖). 
 200. Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69–70 (1938). 
 201. See Ely, supra note 11, at 729 (discussing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 
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Jersey had enacted a statute requiring a plaintiff ―to post a bond securing 
payment of defense costs‖ before instituting a shareholder derivative 
suit.202  The Cohen Court held that this New Jersey statute did not 
conflict with the applicable Federal Rule and, therefore, resolved the 
conflict under the Erie framework.203  Concurring in Hanna, Justice 
Harlan argued that even if there was a conflict, this New Jersey statute 
―could be expected to have a substantial impact on private primary 
activity‖ and ―reflected policy considerations which, under Erie, would 
lie within the realm of state legislative authority.‖204  Justice Harlan 
failed to identify how to determine when a law lies within the nebulous 
―realm of state legislative authority.‖205  Notably, although stating that 
Cohen would have been the correct result even if the New Jersey law 
and the Federal Rule had conflicted, Justice Harlan did not characterize 
the New Jersey law as ―substantive.‖206 
Although the ―human conduct‖ definition is conceptually helpful, it 
does not adequately solve the Enabling Act problem.  Instead, the 
human conduct definition relies on the ―realm of state legislative 
authority‖ to capture those results that the definition cannot. 
Following the Hanna opinion, Professor Ely came closer to a 
workable definition of substance and procedure.207  Professor Ely 
proffered that a right is substantive when it is granted ―for one or more 
nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do 
with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.‖208  This 
 
541 (1949)). 
 202. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 477.  
 203. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556. 
 204. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 478 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Harlan first noted that the Cohen case 
was not decided under the Enabling Act analysis because the Cohen Court had interpreted Rule 23 to 
avoid a conflict with the New Jersey statute.  Id.  Harlan continued, noting that ―even had even had the 
Federal Rules purported to do so, and in so doing provided a substantially less effective deterrent to 
strike suits, I think the state rule should still have prevailed.‖  Id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. Id. at 477–78. 
 207. Ely, supra note 11. 
 208. Ely, supra note 11, at 725.  Professor Ely also pointed out that ―it is not at all unlikely that 
with respect to a given rule the legislature or other rulemaker will have had two (or more) goals in 
mind—one relating to the management of litigation and one relating to some other concern.‖  Id. at 726; 
see also Freer & Arthur, supra note 22, at 64 (―No one doubts that procedures may be designed—for 
substantive policy reasons—to make it easier in a close case for one side to prevail.‖).  It has long been 
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definition was able to accommodate the result in Cohen—even though 
the effect of the bond statute in Cohen was to halt litigation before it 
started, this was ―done for a substantive purpose.‖209 
This definition also adequately explained how to treat a statute of 
limitations.  A statute of limitations is a ―‗door closing‘ rule[]‖210 and is 
limited to conduct that occurs at the courthouse door.  Statutes of 
limitations seem primarily directed at influencing litigation conduct 
more than human conduct—i.e., it influences someone to file a suit by a 
particular time.  Professor Ely has pointed out, however, that a statute of 
limitations also allows ―potential defendants to breathe easy after the 
passage of the designated period‖ and that this ―purpose[] . . . cannot be 
dismissed as procedural.‖211 
So, Professor Ely‘s definition actually provided a line between 
substance and procedure because it included laws with substantive 
purposes within the substantive category.212  Professor Ely, however, 
failed to provide a workable way to determine when a law had been 
enacted for a substantive purpose.  According to Ely, the Supreme Court 
reached the correct result in Hanna, which allowed Federal Rule 4(d)(1) 
to trump a state law that required in-hand service for a case involving an 
executor of an estate.  Ely argued that this was correct because ―the state 
rule thus subordinated was one concerned with assuring actual notice 
 
recognized that a procedural-looking law can be substantive: ―The 1926 Senate Judiciary Committee 
noted that ‗some of our most valued civil liberties have been obtained through the creation by legislative 
edict of mere remedial measures.‘‖  Burbank & Wolff, supra note 5, at 47.  ―Congress has learned the 
power of procedure and knows how to pursue or mask substantive aims in procedural dress.‖  Id. at 51.  
One commentator has suggested a definition that attempts to combine the principles expressed in 
Harlan‘s concurrence and expressed by Professor Ely: ―a rule is substantive in this context—not subject 
to displacement by an Enabling Act rule—(a) if it has a nonprocedural purposes, or (b) even if its 
purposes are entirely procedural, if it is calculated to affect behavior at the planning as distinguished 
from the disputative stage of activity.‖  Olin Guy Wellborn III, The Federal Rules of Evidence and 
Application of State Law in Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371, 404 (1977) 
 209. Ely, supra note 11, at 729. 
 210. See id. at 732. 
 211. See id. at 730–31. 
 212. A contrary rule would violate principles of federalism.  See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1450 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (―In our federalist 
system, Congress has not mandated that federal courts dictate to state legislatures the form that their 
substantive law must take.  And were federal courts to ignore those portions of substantive state law that 
operate as procedural devices, it would in many instances limit the ways that sovereign States may 
define their rights and remedies.‖). 
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and therefore a fair opportunity to appear and be heard.‖213  But how 
does one know that the purpose of the displaced state law was only 
notice and a fair opportunity to be heard?  The First Circuit, before the 
matter was appealed to the Supreme Court, had concluded that the 
service of process rule was ―a substantive rather than a procedural 
matter.‖214  As noted by the First Circuit, this Massachusetts service of 
process rule was a part of a ―[s]pecial statute[] of limitations to 
effectuate the safe and ‗speedy settlement of estates that the heirs might 
be quieted.‘‖215  This stark disagreement demonstrates the difficulty in 
reliably determining whether a state law has a substantive purpose. 
b. Finding the Purpose of the To-Be Displaced State Law 
The concept of transsubstantivity can be used as a tool to reliably 
determine when a law has a substantive purpose.  In the Enabling Act 
universe, a state law can be three things: (1) substantive, (2) procedural, 
or (3) both substantive and procedural.216  The state-law 
transsubstantivity approach begins distinguishing between substance and 
procedure by identifying what is purely procedural—i.e., that which can 
be characterized as procedural and nothing else.  A law that is 
transsubstantive speaks only to matters of procedure; the law does not 
 
 213. Ely, supra note 11, at 732.  Even Professor Ely recognized that Massachusetts‘ service-of-
process rule could be thought of as a substantive in the same way that a statute of limitations was 
substantive: ―There is, of course, a sense in which one will ‗breathe easier‘ simply by virtue of the 
assurance that the state is making a special effort to ensure that notice of suit will not get lost.‖  Id. at 
732. 
 214. Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964). 
 215. Id. (quoting Brown v. Anderson, 13 Mass. 201, 202 (1816)). 
 216. Following Shady Grove, Professor Tidmarsh published a fascinating article suggesting a 
complete reformulation of Erie and the Enabling Act.  See Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 880.  The author 
reads Professor Tidmarsh to confront the Enabling Act problem from the opposite direction—i.e., 
Professor Tidmarsh tries to distill a law down to its substantive essence.  Id.  He explains his approach 
as follows: 
In brief, if we assume a world in which processing a state-law claim from filing through 
settlement or judgment is costless and outcome-neutral, the claim has an expected value at the 
time of its hypothetical filing in a state court.  This value is a product of the probability of 
recovery and the amount of the remedy if liability is found.  What a federal court cannot do—
whether its choice involves a Federal Rule or a common-law procedural rule—is to choose a rule 
that affects this expected value. 
Id. at 880–81. 
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speak to any substantive matter.  This is not to say that a 
transsubstantive law is value-neutral.217  But a transsubstantive rule is 
concerned only with matters of ―mak[ing] the process of litigation a fair 
and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes.‖218  There can be 
no substantive purpose in a law that does not address any particular type 
of substantive claim.  A law that is transsubstantive, therefore, is purely 
procedural.  A law that is purely procedural and can reliably be placed 
within the procedural category.  A court‘s application of a Federal Rule 
to trump such a law is therefore unproblematic under the Enabling Act. 
The state-law transsubstantivity approach then presumes that, of the 
three types of laws in the Enabling Act universe (substantive, 
procedural, or substantive and procedural), only transsubstantive laws 
can fall within the procedural type.  Any law that lacks 
transsubstantivity must create or define some substantive right.  The 
foundation for this approach is the assumption that when a state 
legislature is not speaking purely about procedure, it is speaking about 
substance.  And when a state legislature is speaking about substance, the 
legislature has at least some substantive purpose for enacting the law. 
This presumption is not inexorable—i.e., this presumption does not 
inevitably flow from the idea that a transsubstantive law is purely 
procedural.219  Specifically, it is possible that a legislature may enact a 
state law that lacks transsubstantivity for purely procedural reasons.  For 
example, in Shady Grove, Justice Stevens suggests that § 901(b) can be 
read as a ―procedural calibration of making it easier to litigate claims in 
 
 217. Marcus, supra note 23, at 379–80. 
 218. Ely, supra note 11, at 724. 
 219. Certainly the Constitution does not require adopting this definition of substance and 
procedure.  It seems likely that Congress has the authority to declare the rule announced by Justice 
Scalia—i.e., a Federal Rule will govern in federal courts regardless of the state law that it trumps.  See 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (2010) (―[I]t is not the 
substantive or procedural nature of the affected state law that matters, but that of the Federal Rule.‖); 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) 
(―The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power over 
procedure. The [Article Three] and the ―necessary and proper‖ clause of Article One may fully authorize 
legislation, such as this section of the Judiciary Act.‖); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) 
(―[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those 
courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain 
area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.‖). 
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New York courts (under any source of law) only when it is necessary to 
do so, and not making it too easy when the class tool is not required.‖220  
It is therefore possible to imagine a law that lacks transsubstantivity as 
having only a procedural purpose.221 
Justice Stevens, in fact, in his intertwined approach, essentially 
proposes his own presumption.  For Justice Stevens, when a state law 
and a Federal Rule are in conflict, application of the Federal Rule is 
unproblematic (i.e., the state law is procedural) unless there is ―little 
doubt‖ that state law is substantive.222   
Both the state-law transsubstantivity approach and Justice Stevens‘ 
approach, then, rely on presumptions.  The presumption underlying the 
 
 220. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 221. It is also possible to imagine a transsubstantive law that has a substantive purpose.  For 
example, imagine a state that has enacted a transsubstantive statute of limitations as State Law § 1: ―All 
claims must be commenced within two years of the cause of action‘s accrual.‖  (It is hard to imagine this 
happening and the author is not aware of any state that has done this.  Statutes of limitations generally 
fix a time limit because of the facts that typically come up in that type of cause of action.  So, for 
example, a personal injury statute of limitations may be shorter than a contract statute of limitations.)  
Then, the Supreme Court promulgated a hypothetical Federal Rule 87: ―All claims must be commenced 
within one year of the cause of action‘s accrual.‖  These two statutes conflict, and allowing the Federal 
Rule 87 to trump State Law § 1 would seem to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right.  The 
state-law transsubstantivity approach would require application of the Federal Rule 87 over State Law 
§ 1 because State Law § 1 is transsubstantive.  Importantly, however, the state-law transsubstantivity 
approach is designed only to solve the Enabling Act problem in Shady Grove—i.e., how does a court 
distinguish between substantive and procedural for the purposes of the Enabling Act‘s abridge, enlarge, 
or modify limitation on the Supreme Court‘s rulemaking authority?  In the hypothetical conflict between 
Federal Rule 87 and State Law § 1, the abridge, enlarge, or modify may never come up.  This is because 
the Enabling Act, in § 2072(a), grants the Supreme Court with authority only to promulgate ―general 
rules of practice and procedure‖—a federal statute of limitations may not be a rule of practice or 
procedure but instead a definition of substantive rights.  The workable distinction between ―substantive‖ 
and ―procedural‖ proposed here is only meant to apply to the language in § 2072(b).  The notion that 
§ 2072(a) should handle this hypothetical conflict in some ways just avoids a hard question—when does 
a law that appears transsubstantive actually have a substantive purpose?  But it seems that this question 
would only rarely arise and its difficulty does not wholly undercut the administrative simplicity of the 
state-law transsubstantivity approach. 
 222. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens states that it will 
be ―rare‖ that a conflicting state law will satisfy this test.  Id. at 1454 n.10 (citations omitted) (―It will be 
rare that a federal rule that is facially valid under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 will displace a State's definition of 
its own substantive rights.‖).  He also states that ―the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a high 
one.‖  Id. at 1457.  Justice Stevens also assumes that when a state law conflicts when a Federal Rule, the 
state law will typically look procedural.  See id. at 1457 (―The mere fact that a state law is designed as a 
procedural rule suggests it reflects a judgment about how state courts ought to operate and not a 
judgment about the scope of state-created rights and remedies.‖). 
41
Brown: FOR LACK OF A BETTER RULE: USING THE CONCEPT OF TRANSSUBSTANTIVIT
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012
42 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80 
state-law transsubstantivity approach (that a state law that lacks 
transsubstantivity must create or define some substantive right) is 
preferable for two reasons. 
First, there is nothing in the Enabling Act that compels or even 
suggests Justice Stevens‘ ―little doubt‖ approach.  Instead, the Enabling 
Act categorically prohibits ―abridg[ing], enlarg[ing] or modify[ing] any 
substantive right.‖223  The Enabling Act‘s ―any substantive right‖ 
language should mean ―any substantive right,‖ regardless of how a state 
legislature has chosen to grant that substantive right.224  Justice Stevens 
acknowledged that it was ―plausible‖ that New York adopted § 901(b) 
because the state ―wished to create a ‗limitation‘ on New York‘s 
‗statutory damages,‘‖225 which would be a substantive purpose.  Even 
so, Justice Stevens concludes that § 901(b) should be treated as 
procedural because ―there are costs involved in attempting to discover 
the true nature of a state procedural rule.‖226 
Second, the Enabling Act is the result of Congress‘s judgment about 
when it is proper to delegate authority to another coequal branch of the 
federal government, the Supreme Court, and the boundaries of that 
delegation.  The Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence on congressional limits 
imposed on subject-matter jurisdiction can be instructive here.  Subject-
matter jurisdiction ―concerns the fundamental constitutional question of 
the allocation of judicial power between the federal and state 
governments.‖227  The Supreme Court has cautioned that federal courts 
must assiduously observe congressional limits on jurisdiction.228  
 
 223. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 224. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1450 (Stevens, J., concurring) (―[W]ere federal courts to 
ignore those portions of substantive state law that operate as procedural devices, it could in many 
instances limit the ways that sovereign States may define their rights and remedies.‖). 
 225. Id. at 1457. Justice Stevens, in his analysis of § 901(b) under the ―intertwined‖ approach 
stated that ―there [we]re two plausible competing narratives‖ about the purpose of § 901(b).  Id. at 1459. 
 226. Id. at 1457 (―And for the purposes of operating a federal court system, there are costs 
involved in attempting to discover the true nature of a state procedural rule and allowing such a rule to 
operate alongside a federal rule that appears to govern the same question.  The mere possibility that a 
federal rule would alter a state-created right is not sufficient.  There must be little doubt.‖). 
 227. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. 
FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522 (3d ed. 2008). 
 228. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) 
(―Subject-matter jurisdiction, then, is an Art. III as well as a statutory requirement; it functions as a 
restriction on federal power, and contributes to the characterization of the federal sovereign.  Certain 
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Similarly, the Enabling Act is a limitation imposed by Congress on the 
authority of the Supreme Court.  The Enabling Act limitation on the 
Supreme Court‘s authority should, therefore, similarly be assiduously 
observed.  In other words, Justice Stevens permits room for error on the 
wrong side of the issue. 
The language in the Enabling Act, in light of the Supreme Court‘s 
traditional observance of congressional limitations on the Supreme 
Court‘s power, supports the state-law transsubstantivity presumption.  
Unless a court can conclude that a law is procedural within the Enabling 
Act universe, the law is either substantive or ostensibly procedural with 
a substantive purpose.229  The argument here is not that this is the only 
conceivable way to apply the Enabling Act‘s ―abridge, enlarge or 
modify‖ limitation; rather, the argument here is only that this 
presumption better carries out the Enabling Act. 
C. Deference to Important State Interests 
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, argued that the Court ―relentlessly‖ 
read Federal Rule 23 to override important state interests.230  According 
to Justice Ginsburg, the majority ―approve[d] Shady Grove‘s attempt to 
transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award, although the State 
 
legal consequences directly follow from this.  For example, no action of the parties can confer subject-
matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.  Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant, California v. 
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), principles of estoppel do not apply, Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 
U.S. 6, 17–18 (1951), and a party does not waive the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction 
early in the proceedings.‖). 
 229. Whether this presumption should be rebuttable is a question that should be saved for a state 
law that presents such an issue.  Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 
(1958).  In Byrd, the Court faced the question whether the South Carolina practice of having a judge 
(rather than a jury) determine factual issues associated with the workers-compensation bar to tort suits 
was ―a rule intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties.‖  Id.  
The Court concluded that it was not, stating, ―[the practice] is grounded in the practical consideration 
that the question had therefore come before the South Carolina courts from the Industrial Commission 
and the courts had become accustomed to deciding the factual issue of immunity without the aid of 
juries.‖  Id.  Byrd is arguably different because the non-transsubstantive practice established in that case 
was established by courts and not the legislature.  This is not to say that rule pronounced by a state court 
do not qualify as state law, but only to suggest that the process for adopting a common law practice in a 
state court may be so different than legislation that the presumption does not hold up. 
 230. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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creating the right to recover has proscribed this alchemy.‖231 
Unlike Justice Scalia‘s and Justice Stevens‘ approaches, the state-law 
transsubstantivity approach would defer to state policy judgments 
directed at anything other than the simple efficiency of courts.232  When 
a state legislature selects a particular substantive claim for special 
treatment, a federal court sitting in diversity would be required to give 
that particular substantive claim the same special treatment afforded in 
state court.233  This approach, therefore, accommodates Justice 
Ginsburg‘s concern for deference to important state interests. 
In its deference to state legislatures, the state-law transsubstantivity 
approach should have the added benefit of helping to resolve the 
disagreement in Shady Grove (the Court split five to four) on whether 
§ 901(b) and Federal Rule 23 were in conflict.  Justice Scalia argued 
that, to determine whether a conflict exists, a court must determine 
whether the state law and the Federal Rule both supply an answer to the 
―question in dispute.‖234  According to Justice Scalia, under the only 
reasonable interpretation, Federal Rule 23 conflicted with New York‘s 
§ 901(b).235  Justice Ginsburg called Justice Scalia‘s interpretation 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. Cf. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4504 (summarizing the Hanna opinion‘s really 
regulates procedure test and raising the question, ―But has the pendulum swung too far?‖); id. § 4509 
(noting that the Sibbach test ―is no test at all—in a sense, it is little more than the statement that a matter 
is procedural if, by revelation, it is procedural‖). 
 233. There are hypothetical state statutes that would seem to test the notion that federal courts 
should defer to state legislatures when a particular claim is singled out for special treatment.  Take, for 
example, a state statute that required that different colored covers be used for filings in different kinds of 
cases (e.g., red for contract/tort cases; blue for civil rights cases; etc.).  Such a statute would be 
nontransubstantive, but it would seem like statute that is really directed at the efficient prosecution of 
claims, rather than substantive rights.  Under the state-law transsubstantivity approach however, a 
federal court would be required to follow such a state law.  Such a result seems problematic; after all, 
the color of a cover sheet for a civil case seems fairly trivial.  But one of the points of the state-law 
transsubstantivity is to avoid normative judgments about the triviality or importance of a conflicting 
state law.  However, to the extent that a state statute would impose unduly taxing administrative burdens 
on federal courts, it may be necessary to include some sort of constitutional backstop on the power of a 
state legislature to impose the applicable of procedures in federal courts.  See infra note 246 and 
accompanying text. 
 234. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 (―We must first determine whether Rule 23 answers the 
question in dispute . . . .  The question in dispute is whether Shady Grove‘s suit may proceed as a class 
action.  Rule 23 provides an answer. . . .  [Section] 901(b) attempts to answer the same question . . . .  
[Rule 23 and § 901(b)] flatly contradict each other.‖). 
 235. Id. at 1441 n.7 (―[T]here is only one reasonable reading of Rule 23.‖). 
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―relentless[]‖ and ―mechanical.‖236 
The disagreement between Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg on this 
issue was driven by a disagreement on how much the policies 
underlying Erie should influence the interpretation of the scope of a 
Federal Rule.237  Justice Scalia argued that the Court ―should read an 
ambiguous Federal Rule to avoid ‗substantial variations [in outcomes] 
between state and federal litigation.‘‖238  Justice Ginsburg, on the other 
hand, stated that a Federal Rule should be interpreted ―‗with sensitivity 
to important state interests‘ and a will ‗to avoid conflict with important 
state regulatory policies.‘‖239  Justice Ginsburg seemed to put a heavier 
thumb on the no-conflict side of the scale when interpreting a Federal 
Rule.240  Although defining conflict is not the function of the state-law 
transsubstantivity approach, divorcing the consideration of important 
state policy considerations from the interpretation of the Federal Rules 
may help to bring more consistency to the interpretation of the Rules.241   
Despite these benefits, an argument can be made that the state-law 
transsubstantivity approach is too deferential to state interests.  In 
rejecting Justice Stevens‘ intertwined approach, Justice Scalia argued 
that Justice Stevens‘ approach could allow states too much influence on 
procedure in federal courts.  Too much deference would ―allow States to 
force a wide array of parochial procedures on federal courts.‖242  The 
state-law transsubstantivity approach is, arguably, even more susceptible 
 
 236. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 237. See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text. 
 238. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 n.7.  Justice Scalia states that ―there is only one reasonable 
reading of Rule 23‖ and that is in conflict with § 901(b).  Id.  Justice Ginsburg, on the other hand, 
argued that the Court unnecessarily read into Rule 23 a conflict with § 901(b).  Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (―The Court reads Rule 23 relentlessly to override New York's restriction on the availability 
of statutory damages.‖). 
 239. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1463 (citations omitted). 
 240. This strong disagreement is unsurprising given the Supreme Court‘s inconsistent 
interpretation of the Federal Rules in Enabling Act cases.  See Freer & Arthur, supra note 22, at 70 
(―Through the years, the Court has been anything but consistent in its approach to the important 
funneling function of assessing the breadth of a Federal Rule.‖). 
 241. In addressing examples of the application of the state-law transsubstantivity approach, this 
Article will apply Justice Scalia‘s question in dispute approach. 
 242. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1446 n.11.  Cf. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4504 
(noting that the outcome-determinative test of York was criticized because ―[a]pplied literally, very little 
would have remained of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in diversity cases‖). 
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to this criticism than Justice Stevens‘ intertwined approach.243 
Addressing this criticism is best done with an example.  Imagine that 
a state passed the hypothetical State Law § 2: ―No claim for injuries 
caused by negligent operation of a motor vehicle can be dismissed 
before a full trial on the merits.‖  This law lacks transsubstantivity and, 
therefore, would be categorized as an ostensibly procedural law with a 
substantive purpose.  Assuming that this law would conflict with the 
several Federal Rules that allow for dismissal of an action before trial 
(Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 56), a federal court sitting in diversity 
would be required to apply State Law § 2. 
Application of State Law § 2 would require a federal court to forego 
two of the traditional tools for efficiently screening out unmeritorious 
claims before trial.  An approach that allows a state legislature this much 
control over federal courts seems problematic.244  But why?245  If a state 
 
 243. The comparison with the ―deferential interpretation‖ approach is somewhat more 
complicated.  The ―deferential interpretation‖ approach would only apply a state procedural law when 
the failure to apply the state procedural law would be problematic under Erie‘s twin aims.  Some cases 
reasonably involving a conflict between a federal rule and a state law that is not transsubstantive may 
nonetheless apply the federal rule because the state law does not pose any problem under the traditional 
Erie analysis.  In this narrow class of cases, however, the state rule would apply under the ―state-law 
transsubstantivity‖ approach.  The ―state-law transsubstantivity‖ approach would also, potentially, apply 
the federal rule in some cases when the ―deferential interpretation‖ approach would apply the state rule.  
If, for example, the failure to apply a conflicting and transsubstantive state rule would cause an Erie 
problem, the ―deferential interpretation‖ approach would apply the state law and the ―state-law 
transsubstantivity‖ approach would apply the federal rule. 
 244. There certainly are federal interests at stake.  19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4501 
(noting the difficulty in ―reconciling the tension between Erie‘s command that federal courts must honor 
state substantive law when it is applicable[] and the integrity of the federal courts as an independent 
judicial system‖).  Once the federal judicial system affords a federal forum to certain kinds of litigation, 
including cases based on the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the federal courts have an interest in 
uniformity of the procedure used in every federal court for the various stages of the litigation, because 
uniformity helps the parties, attorneys and judges know what the rules are.  See Bauer, supra note 4, at 
22–23.  Uniformity in turn also leads to greater ease of administration of the judicial process; federal 
courts will have to look to fewer sources for resolving controverted issues, and they will be sources with 
which the courts are more familiar.  Id.  Differing state procedural requirements also might compel 
federal courts to create unique mechanisms to accommodate them.  Federal courts also have an interest 
in docket control, including deciding which cases will continue, and in what form, and what actions 
should be terminated, and when, and under what standards.  Finally, in diversity cases, federal courts 
have an interest in providing a forum that is, or is perceived to be, less biased against out-of-state 
litigants. 
 245. Cf. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (―[T]he intent [of Erie] was to insure 
that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of 
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has made a judgment to require that all claims for negligent operation of 
a motor vehicle go to trial for the substantive purpose of guaranteeing its 
citizens the right to drive in a safe environment, is it up to a federal 
district court to decide that the state legislature is incorrect?  A refusal to 
apply State Law § 2 in federal courts would implicate Erie‘s twin aims, 
which, at bottom, are focused on fairness. 
At some point, an unduly burdensome state law might run up against 
―the Constitution‘s grant of power over federal procedure‖246 to the 
federal government, but this is not a reason to reject the state-law 
transsubstantivity approach.  That a state would pass such a burdensome 
law seems unlikely.  States generally face the same pressures of 
overworked and overburdened courts that the federal government faces.  
Even if there exists some possibility that a future case would be 
problematic, this remote possibility does not make untenable the state-
law transsubstantivity approach. 
V. APPLICATION OF THE STATE-LAW TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY APPROACH IN 
PRACTICE 
Several example cases will help demonstrate how the state-law 
transsubstantivity approach would work in practice. 
A. Service of Process 
As discussed above, in Hanna, the Court was faced with the decision 
between a Massachusetts General Law ch. 197 § 9 (which required in-
hand service for a case involving an executor)247 and Federal Rule 
 
citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the 
same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.‖). 
 246. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (―To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be 
to disembowel either the Constitution‘s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress‘ attempt to 
exercise that power in the Enabling Act.  Rule 4(d)(1) is valid and controls the instant case.‖). 
 247. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958) (―Except as provided in this chapter, an 
executor or administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which is 
not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond for the performance of his trust, or to 
such an action which is commenced within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such 
action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator or service thereof 
accepted by him or a notice stating the name of the estate, the name and address of the creditor, the 
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4(d)(1) (which allowed service of process at a defendant‘s house).248  In 
the Hanna case, service of process was purportedly made when 
Plumer‘s wife received the complaint and summons at Plumer‘s 
house.249 
Plumer later moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hanna could 
not maintain her case because Plumer had not been served in-hand as 
required by Massachusetts.250  The question in dispute in Hanna was 
whether Plumer had been properly served.  Because both the 
Massachusetts law and the Federal Rule 4(d)(1) answered the same 
question in dispute, there was a conflict.251 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, hearing the Hanna case before the 
Supreme Court, had stated that the law was actually designed to ensure 
that heirs would be quieted: 
[I]n addition to service sufficient to satisfy due process requirements for 
in personam jurisdiction, the executor, a creature of the Massachusetts 
court charged with the administration and disposition of the estate sought 
to be reached, was by law entitled to receive specific notification of the 
action within the year.  Special statutes of limitations to effectuate the 
safe and speedy settlement of estates that the heirs might be quieted have 
been operative in the Commonwealth for over 150 years.  Relatively 
recent amendments evince a clear legislative purpose to require personal 
notification within the year, ascertainable of record.  This matter is quite 
apart from the question of what is adequate service of process in the 
procedural sense.  Actual, record notice would appear fully as substantive 
a state requirement binding in the federal court as is a requirement that in 
certain actions a bond must be furnished for costs.
252
 
The Supreme Court, with almost no analysis, reversed this judgment 
of the First Circuit and held that ―Rule 4(d)(1) is valid and controls the 
 
amount of the claim and the court in which the action has been brought has been filed in the proper 
registry of probate . . . .‖). 
 248. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461 (―[S]ervice was made by leaving copies of the summons and the 
complaint with respondent‘s wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4(d)(1).‖). 
 249. Id. at 461.  
 250. Id. at 462–63.  
 251. Cf. id. at 470 (noting that the conflict in Hanna was ―unavoidable‖ and distinguishing other 
cases where the purportedly conflicting Federal Rule did not ―cover[] the point in dispute‖). 
 252. Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
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instant case.‖253  The Court reasoned that ―[t]o hold that a Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of 
enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the 
Constitution‘s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress‘ 
attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.‖254 
Under the state-law transsubstantivity approach, after finding a 
conflict, the court should have whether the state law was purely 
procedural—i.e., transsubstantive—to determine if application of the 
Federal Rule would violate the Enabling Act. 
The Massachusetts law was not transsubstantive.  The law only 
applied to a claim by a creditor against an executor or administrator.255  
It was not purely procedural and, therefore, would have been presumed 
to have at least some substantive purpose.  The state law, therefore, 
embodied a protection on a creditor and the heirs of an estate.   
This conclusion makes sense, too.  Hanna had sued Plumer for 
injuries that Plumer did not cause.  Plumer was the executor of the estate 
of the person that injured Hanna.  An executor is ―a creature of the 
Massachusetts court charged with the administration and disposition of 
the estate sought to be reached.‖256  Massachusetts, by creating this 
institution should be able to control exactly what it should and should 
not be entitled to receive because the purpose of this institution was to 
ensure a ―safe and ‗speedy settlement of estates that the heirs might be 
quieted.‘‖257  Massachusetts was apparently concerned that heirs be able 
to breathe easy and know the disposition of an estate after one year was 
final.  It is not the place for the Supreme Court to second guess this 
decision.258 
 
 253. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474. 
 254. Id. at 473–74. 
 255. Id. at 461–62.  
 256. Hanna, 331 F.2d at 159. 
 257. Id. at 159 (quoting Brown v. Anderson, 13 Mass. 201, 202 (1816)). 
 258. Cf. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469 (―Moreover, it is difficult to argue that permitting service of 
defendant‘s wife to take the place of in-hand service of defendant himself alters the mode of 
enforcement of state-created rights in a fashion sufficiently ‗substantial‘ to raise the sort of equal 
protection problems to which the Erie opinion alluded.‖). 
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B. Pleading Standards 
There has been much debate about how much (and even whether) the 
Twombly and Iqbal cases changed pleading standards in federal court.259  
Assuming, however, that the cases have heightened pleading standards a 
perceptible amount, and that this change will make a difference in some 
cases, it can be argued that Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is in conflict with a 
state rule 12(b)(6) that has not adopted the Twombly and Iqbal gloss. 
For example, in 2010, the Supreme Court of Washington expressly 
―decline[d]‖ to adopt the Twombly and Iqbal gloss on the motion to 
dismiss because it had not been presented with ―the type of facts and 
figures (specific to the Washington trial courts) that were presented to, 
and persuaded, the United States Supreme Court to alter its 
interpretation‖ of the motion to dismiss.260 
For a case brought in a federal district court that sits in Washington 
State, there is an argument (on the above assumptions) that the federal 
court should apply Washington‘s rule on the motion to dismiss.  Both 
rules would answer the same question—whether the plaintiff had stated 
a claim.  To determine how to resolve that conflict, a court would 
examine the nature of the conflicting state law. 
Washington Civil Rule 12(b)(6) states that: 
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, shall be 
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that 
the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
 
 259. See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010); Edward A. 
Hartnett, Taming Twombly Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010).  The Twombly and Iqbal 
cases, however, only explicitly apply to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and do not govern any 
state rule on a motion to dismiss.  In Conley v. Gibson, a seminal case on pleading standards in federal 
court, the Supreme Court had stated that ―a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.‖  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).  In Twombly, the Supreme Court 
stated that this ―no set of facts‖ language ―ha[d] earned its retirement.‖  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 563 (2007).  Restating the test for a motion to dismiss, the Twombly Court stated that a 
plaintiff must plead ―enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its fact.‖  Id. at 570. 
 260. McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, 233 P.3d 861, 863–64 (Wash. 2010); see also Roger 
Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things To Come: The Great Split Between Federal and State Pleading 
Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/10/27/michalski.html. 
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granted . . . .
261
 
This rule applies to ―a claim for relief in any pleading‖ and is 
therefore transsubstantive.262  Because this rule is transsubstantive, 
Federal Rule 12(b)(6) (and the Twombly and Iqbal gloss) would govern 
a motion to dismiss in a federal district court sitting in Washington state 
under the ―state-law transsubstantivity‖ approach.263   
A rule on a motion to dismiss applicable to all cases does not reflect 
how a substantive right is protected.  Instead it governs purely how it is 
enforced in a court.  This hypothetical case demonstrates that, under the 
state-law transsubstantivity approach, the Federal Rules are not 
―disembowel[ed],‖264 but will trump conflicting state laws that are 
purely procedural. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In summary, under the state-law transsubstantivity approach, when a 
Federal Rule conflicts with a state law, a court should examine the 
nature of the state law to determine whether the state law is 
transsubstantive.  If the state law is not transsubstantive, the court 
should presume that the state law protects some substantive right.  
Application of the Federal Rule over the conflicting state law that is not 
transubstantive, therefore, would abridge, enlarge, or modify a 
substantive right in violation of the Enabling Act.265  Because 
application of the Federal Rule would violate the Enabling Act, the 
Federal Rule must yield to the conflicting state law. 
The state-law transsubstantivity approach outlined here provides a 
rule that will accommodate the various policy interests that divided the 
Justices in Shady Grove: the approach is easily administrable and will 
 
 261. WASH. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 262. If the Washington Supreme Court interpreted this transsubstantive Civil Rule 12(b)(6) to 
require heightened pleading in employment discrimination cases, the Washington Supreme Court gloss 
would be substantive under this state-law transsubstantivity approach.  This is because such gloss would 
not be gloss at all but instead a common law substantive rule that is applicable to a particular type of 
claim that a federal court would be required to follow. 
 263. But see Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine (And What Does It Mean for the 
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2008). 
 264. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74 (1965). 
 265. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
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not require federal courts to delve into state legislative history,266 the 
approach does not write language out of the Enabling Act,267 and the 
approach gives deference to judgments made by state legislatures about 
substantive rights.268 
 
 266. Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1441 (2010). 
(criticizing the ―deferential interpretation‖ approach for requiring federal judges to ―por[e] through state 
legislative history‖); id. at 1447 n.14 (criticizing the ―intertwined‖ approach as ―inscrutable‖ and as 
―forcing federal courts to assess the substantive or procedural character of countless state rules that may 
conflict with a single Federal Rule‖). 
 267. Cf. id. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring) (criticizing the really regulates procedure approach 
for ―ignor[ing] text and context in the service of simplicity‖). 
 268. Cf. id. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for a ―mechanical reading of 
Federal Rules [that was] insensitive to state interests and productive of discord‖). 
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